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FREE SPEECH AND THE MILITARY
RECRUITER: REAFFIRMING THE
MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS
Major Charles G. Kels, USAF*
[Editor’s Note: The military’s “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy was repealed
during the editing of this Article.  However, Major Kels’s discussion of the
First Amendment, not the military’s policy, is the heart of the Article.  His
analysis remains relevant in spite of the repeal and will no doubt apply to
future First Amendment conflicts between conduct and expression.]
“Access, yes, but be respectful of speech.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
In October 2009, President Barack Obama promised to “end ‘don’t ask,
don’t tell.’”2  Three months later, the President reiterated in the State of the
Union address his intention “to finally repeal the law that denies gay Americans
the right to serve the country they love because of who they are.”3  According
to the Secretary of Defense, “[t]he question before us is not whether the mili-
tary prepares to make this change, but how we best prepare for it.  We have
received our orders from the Commander in Chief and we are moving out
accordingly.”4
For fifteen years, the debate over the status of homosexuals in the armed
forces has been linked to the controversy over the status of military recruiters
and Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) detachments on college and law
school campuses.  The first iteration of the Solomon Amendment, denying cer-
tain Department of Defense (DOD) funds to institutions of higher education
* Medical Law Consultant, Mike O’Callaghan Federal Hospital, Nellis Air Force Base,
Nevada.  Opinions expressed in this Article are those of the author alone and do not
necessarily reflect those of the Air Force or Defense Department.
1 Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional
Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (No. 04-1152), available at http://www.supremecourtus.
gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/04-1152.pdf [hereinafter Transcript of Oral
Argument].
2 President Barack H. Obama, Remarks at the Human Rights Campaign Annual Dinner
(Oct. 10, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-
human-rights-campaign-dinner.
3 President Barack H. Obama, Address Before Joint Session of the Congress on the State of
the Union (Jan. 27, 2010), available at www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2010/DCPD-2010000
55.pdf.
4 Robert M. Gates, Sec’y of Def., Statement on “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (Feb. 2, 2010)
(statement of Robert M. Gates, Sec’y of Def.), http://www.defense.gov/Speeches/Speech.
aspx?SpeechID=1419.
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that effectively prohibited access by DOD recruiters, was included in the
Defense authorization bill5 the year after Congress passed the current prohibi-
tion on homosexual conduct in the military.6
How recent revisions to the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” regulations,7 not to
mention the apparent impermanence of the law itself,8 will impact the reception
that military recruiters receive on university campuses is a matter that will no
doubt play out as the next chapter of the debate unfolds.  No matter the end
result of the efforts to repeal the homosexual policy, the litigation that ensued
over the related issue of making certain federal funding contingent on military
5 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337, § 558,
108 Stat. 2663, 2776 (1994).
6 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 571,
107 Stat. 1547, 1670 (1993).
7 Memorandum from the Sec’y of Def. to the Sec’ys of the Military Dep’ts, (Mar. 25, 2010),
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/29167347/Defense-Department-Don-t-Ask-Don-t-
Tell-Changes (scroll down to Enclosure 3).
8 On Sep. 21, 2010, the Senate failed to reach the sixty votes needed to overcome a filibus-
ter and begin debate on an annual defense appropriations bill which included a provision
repealing the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy. See David M. Herszenhorn, Senators Vote to
Block Debate on Military Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 22, 2010, at A1.  Two recent federal district
court rulings within the Ninth Circuit have garnered headlines for their opposition to “Don’t
Ask, Don’t Tell.”  On Sep. 24, 2010, Judge Ronald B. Leighton issued a memorandum opin-
ion ordering an Air Force flight nurse reinstated to her position in the Reserves and finding
that her discharge in 2006 for homosexual conduct had violated her Fifth Amendment sub-
stantive due process rights.  Witt v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, No. 06-5195, slip op. at 13
(W.D. Wash. Sep. 24, 2010).  The Ninth Circuit had earlier remanded to the district court,
directing that Maj. Witt’s case be reviewed using a standard beyond mere rational basis
scrutiny.  Witt v. U.S. Dep’t of the Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 821-22 (9th Cir. 2008).  On Oct.
12, 2010, Judge Virginia A. Phillips enjoined the Department of Defense from enforcing 10
U.S.C. § 654 (“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”) as a violation of the First and Fifth Amendments.
Log Cabin Republicans v. United States, No. 04-08425, slip op. at 85 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 12,
2010).  In response, Defense Secretary Robert Gates objected, “I feel very strongly that this
is an action that needs to be taken by the Congress and that it is an action that requires
careful preparation and a lot of training.”  Adam Entous, Gates Says Gay Policy Is Job for
Congress, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2010, at A7.  On Oct. 14, 2010, the Justice Department
moved to stay Judge Phillips’ injunction pending an appeal. See Amanda Bronstad, Govern-
ment Asks for Stay of Injunction Against ‘Don’t Ask,’ NAT’L L.J., Oct. 14, 2010, http://www.
law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202473407818&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1.  When
asked about the homosexual policy during a youth townhall meeting the same day, President
Obama stated;
Now, we recently had a . . . district court case that said, ‘[D]on’t [A]sk, [D]on’t [T]ell’ is uncon-
stitutional.  I agree with the basic principle that anybody who wants to serve in our armed forces
and make sacrifices on our behalf, on behalf of our national security, anybody should be able to
serve.  And they shouldn’t have to lie about who they are in order to serve. And so we are
moving in the direction of ending this policy.  It has to be done in a way that is orderly, because
we are involved in a war right now. But this is not a question of whether the policy will end.
This policy will end and it will end on my watch. But I do have an obligation to make sure that I
am following some of the rules. I can’t simply ignore laws that are out there. I’ve got to work to
make sure that they are changed.
Transcript of Obama’s Youth Townhall, REAL CLEAR POLITICS (Oct. 14, 2010), http://www.
realclearpolitics.com/articles/2010/10/14/transcript_of_obamas_youth_townhall107594.
html.  In 2009, the Supreme Court sided with the Obama Administration in declining to hear
a direct constitutional challenge to “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell.”  Cook v. Gates, 528 F.3d 42, 48,
65 (1st Cir. 2008), cert. denied sub nom. Pietrangelo v. Gates, 129 S. Ct. 2763, 2763 (2009).
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access to potential recruits provided valuable lessons, the relevance of which
may well outlast the controversy that sparked the confrontation.9  These lessons
are important both for the conduct of recruiters in their interactions with stu-
dents, faculty, and administration, and for the concept of free speech itself.10
On the same day the Supreme Court issued its decision11 upholding the
constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment,12 the disappointed respondents
defiantly pointed the way forward.  “The Supreme Court’s opinion,” wrote Pro-
fessor Chai R. Feldblum of the Georgetown University Law Center, “is a call to
arms to law school administrations across the country to vocally demonstrate
their opposition to the military’s ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ policy.”13
E. Joshua Rosenkranz, the attorney who represented the law schools
before the Supreme Court, described the ruling as a “galvanizing moment for
the law school community.”14  In an e-mail to Harvard University’s daily stu-
dent newspaper, Rosenkranz forecast an ominous scene for military recruiters
on law school campuses.  “You will see signs posted over interview rooms that
say, ‘Warning: Discriminating employer inside.’  You will see scarlet letters
put on military recruiting literature.  You will see schools organizing protests to
jeer at recruiters who have a policy of discriminating against the school’s own
students.”15
Professor Kent Greenfield of Boston College Law School, founder and
president of the Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. (FAIR)16—
the lead plaintiff in the Solomon Amendment case17—issued an open letter to
FAIR members imploring them not to “go along silently.  The Court now
9 See Tobias Barrington Wolff, ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Harms the Constitution, but So Does
This Cure, L.A. TIMES, May 15, 2005, at M5.
10 See generally Anita J. Fitch, The Solomon Amendment: A War on Campus, ARMY LAW.,
May 2006, at 12, 19 (“Judge advocates must be prepared to contend with continued hostility
towards the DOD’s policy on homosexual conduct and yet still be able to maintain their
military bearing and professional courtesy at all times.”).
11 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 47 (2006).
12 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2006).
13 Welcome to SolomonResponse.com, SOLOMONRESPONSE.ORG, http://www.law.george
town.edu/solomon (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
14 Javier C. Hernandez, High Court: Schools Must Allow Recruiters, HARV. CRIMSON, Mar.
7, 2006, available at http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2006/3/7/high-court-schools-must-
allow-recruiters/.
15 Id.
16 Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. described FAIR as “an association of law schools and
law faculties” whose “declared mission is ‘to promote academic freedom, support educa-
tional institutions in opposing discrimination and vindicate the rights of institutions of higher
education.’” Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. at 52.  FAIR claims
to represent “36 law schools and law faculties.” Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights, SOLOMONRESPONSE.ORG, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/joinFAIR.html
(last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
17 The other named plaintiffs included the Society of American Law Teachers, Inc. (SALT),
the Coalition for Equality, the Rutgers Gay and Lesbian Caucus, Ms. Pam Nickisher, Ms.
Leslie Fischer, Mr. Michael Blauschild, Prof. Erwin Chemerinsky, and Prof. Sylvia Law.
Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. at 52 n.2.  In addition to Secretary
of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld, the named defendants included the secretaries of the other
government departments with funds potentially affected by the Solomon Amendment; i.e.,
Education, Labor, Health and Human Services, Transportation, and Homeland Security. Id.
at 54 n.3.
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insists that our remedy is protest, and the protests that will follow this opinion
should not be from students only, or professors only.  Institutions can be protes-
tors as well, and they should be.”18
Some might be tempted to dismiss these visceral reactions to the Solomon
Amendment decision as either sour grapes or vain attempts to find a “silver
lining”19 in a thorough 8-020 trouncing at the hands of the conspicuously uni-
fied Justices,21 but the distraught plaintiffs actually were highlighting an impor-
tant aspect of the Court’s opinion.  Indeed, Chief Justice John G. Roberts went
out of his way in authoring the opinion to acknowledge the continued freedom
of law schools “to express whatever views they may have on the military’s
congressionally mandated employment policy, all the while retaining eligibility
for federal funds.”22  In deciding unanimously, the Justices offered a powerful
reaffirmation of a free-speech principle rooted in Thomas Jefferson’s first inau-
gural address, expounded in John Stuart Mill’s 1859 treatise, On Liberty, and
given the imprimatur of a peculiarly American legal doctrine in the early twen-
tieth century jurisprudence of Justices Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. and Louis D.
Brandeis: the best test of an idea’s truth is to subject it to competition in the
wider marketplace.23  The oft-cited corollary to this principle, as expressed by
Justice Stephen G. Breyer during oral argument in the Solomon Amendment
case, is that “the remedy for speech you don’t like, is not less speech, it is more
speech.”24
How did a case about law schools’ opposition to the military’s congressio-
nally mandated homosexual policy become a test of free speech, harkening
back to the most fundamental tenets of First Amendment jurisprudence?  The
answer lies in the way the plaintiffs chose to challenge the constitutionality of
the Solomon Amendment, and how the government elected to defend it.  In
relevant part, the Solomon Amendment denies specified funds to institutions of
higher education that prohibit or prevent national defense agencies from acces-
sing their campuses or student bodies for military recruiting purposes to the
same extent as is afforded any other employer.  The government viewed the
law as a funding condition attached to an equal-access requirement.  The law
schools perceived it as a direct affront to their expressive right to choose their
own members, so as to speak with one voice as a community of shared values.
Whether the Solomon Amendment was properly classified as a law controlling
18 Letter from Kent Greenfield, President, FAIR, to FAIR members (Mar. 21, 2006), http://
www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/documents/greenfieldLetter.pdf.
19 Hernandez, supra note 14 (quoting interview with Kent Greenfield).
20 Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr.’s Senate confirmation hearing had not yet commenced when
oral argument in Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. was heard
before the Court on December 6, 2005.
21 Not only were there no Justices dissenting from Chief Justice Roberts’ majority opinion;
there were no concurring opinions either, with all the other Justices (except Justice Alito,
supra note 20) unqualifiedly joining Roberts’ opinion. See Forum for Academic & Institu-
tional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. at 47.
22 Id. at 60.
23 See ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
80-89 (Vintage Books 1992) (1991) (discussing the contributions of Justices Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. and Louis D. Brandeis to First Amendment jurisprudence in the early twentieth
century).
24 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 43.
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speech, a law regulating conduct, or a law aimed at conduct but secondarily
impinging on speech would ultimately determine the level of judicial scrutiny it
faced and its validity as an exercise of federal power.  The goal of this Article
is to explore both the genesis and aftermath of the Court’s decision, and thereby
understand its ramifications for legal recruiting and, more importantly, for the
future of civil-military relations on law school campuses.
II. ACCESS, NOT SPEECH
From the outset of the Solomon Amendment litigation, the government
was adamant that its goal was neither to curtail nor to supplant the law schools’
constitutionally protected speech, but rather to secure “something that any
donor would expect”25: equal access.  “[T]he military itself,” asserted Solicitor
General Paul D. Clement during oral argument, “simply does not want . . .
primarily a speech activity to take place, it wants access for recruiting.”26  The
Solicitor General likened recruiting to any “traditional commercial enterprise,”
an “instrumental activity” designed to hire personnel, with any attendant speech
entirely “incidental” in nature.27
Essential to the government’s position in this regard was its contention
that a law school’s career-placement office does not serve as a university’s
epicenter of speech.  Much like the military’s purely instrumental recruitment
process, which is constructed solely to encourage qualified applicants to seek
entrance into the armed services, a given law school’s career-placement office
is similarly driven by a non-ideological end: to find jobs for its graduates.28
“It’s worth remembering,” Solicitor General Clement reminded the Court, “that
the recruiting office is not the heart of first-amendment activity on campus.”29
Clement reemphasized the point in his rebuttal argument, noting that when law
schools “incidentally send an e-mail around telling the students where the mili-
tary recruiters are going to be on a certain day . . . that kind of incidental speech
does not implicate any compelled-speech doctrine.”30  FAIR argued precisely
the opposite, that “[r]ecruiting is all about speech.”31
The Court was evidently convinced by the government’s argument that
career placement is an economic, rather than expressive, function of profes-
sional schools.  During oral argument, Justice Anthony M. Kennedy repeatedly
referred to recruiting as a “proposed commercial transaction.”32  As Chief Jus-
tice Roberts ultimately wrote in his unanimous majority opinion:
In this case, accommodating the military’s message does not affect the law schools’
speech, because the schools are not speaking when they host interviews and recruit-
25 Id. at 3 (statement of Solicitor General Clement).
26 Id. at 17 (statement of Solicitor General Clement).
27 Id. (statement of Solicitor General Clement).
28 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64 (2006).
29 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 28 (statement of Solicitor General
Clement).
30 Id. at 61 (rebuttal argument of Solicitor General Clement).
31 Id. at 34 (statement of Rosenkranz).
32 Id. at 49-50 (Justice Kennedy questioning Rosenkranz).
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ing receptions.  Unlike a parade organizer’s choice of parade contingents,33 a law
school’s decision to allow recruiters on campus is not inherently expressive.  Law
schools facilitate recruiting to assist their students in obtaining jobs.  A law school’s
recruiting services lack the expressive quality of a parade, a newsletter,34 or the
editorial page of a newspaper;35 its accommodation of a military recruiter’s message
is not compelled speech because the accommodation does not sufficiently interfere
with any message of the school.36
Indeed, the Court at times seemed genuinely exasperated by the respondents’
comparison between assisting military recruiters with disseminating hiring
materials and forcing schoolchildren to recite the Pledge of Allegiance,37 or
requiring motorists to display a particular motto on their license plates.38  Chief
Justice Roberts termed such recruiting assistance a “far cry” from compelled
speech.39
Compelling a law school that sends scheduling e-mails for other recruiters to send
one for a military recruiter is simply not the same as forcing a student to pledge
allegiance, or forcing a Jehovah’s Witness to display the motto ‘Live Free or Die,’
and it trivializes [those examples] to suggest that it is.40
Whereas FAIR’s attorney argued that the government “cannot convert the
career-services enterprise into a value-neutral proposition,” it was FAIR whom
the Court suspected of falsely portraying the legal job search as “especially
value-driven.”41
The government was empowered to draw such a stark dichotomy between
access and speech precisely because FAIR’s First Amendment claim was so
sweeping.  “[T]here’s simply no limit on Respondent’s argument in this case,”
asserted Solicitor General Clement.  “[A]ny conduct can be imbued with com-
municative force just by saying, ‘We’re opposed to this, and therefore, we’re
going to engage in this conduct.’  That’s simply not enough to generate a sig-
nificant first-amendment interest.”42  The crux of FAIR’s free-speech argument
was that Congress, by conditioning certain federal funds on equal access for
military recruiters,43 was forcing law schools to subsidize or “host the Govern-
33 See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S.
557, 566 (1995).
34 See Pac. Gas & Electric Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 10 (1986).
35 See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974).
36 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64 (2006).
37 W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (declaring unconstitu-
tional a state board of education requirement that public school students salute the flag and
pledge allegiance).
38 Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 717 (1977) (declaring unconstitutional a misdemeanor
statute requiring New Hampshire citizens to display the state motto on their vehicle license
plates).
39 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. at 62.
40 Id.
41 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 49 (statement of Rosenkranz).
42 Id. at 63-64 (rebuttal argument of Solicitor General Clement).
43 The applicable federal funds cover the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security,
Transportation, Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education; the Central Intelligence
Agency; and the National Nuclear Security Administration within the Department of Energy.
The Solomon Amendment does not cover student financial assistance funds. Forum for
Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. at 54 n.3; 10 U.S.C. § 983(d) (2006).
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ment’s message,”44 and thereby engage in compelled speech.  During oral
argument, Justice David H. Souter provided a fair summary of the respondents’
position.45  “I thought . . . in determining the forum for recruiting, the univer-
sity is speaking,” Justice Souter posited to Rosenkranz, “[a]nd I understand the
essence of [FAIR’s] claim to be that its speech is being affected, either by
being mixed with something it doesn’t want to say or by being, in effect, forced
to support . . . something it does not want to say.”46  FAIR’s counsel described
the Solomon Amendment as Congress’s attempt “to squelch even the most
symbolic elements of the law schools’ resistance to disseminating the military’s
message.”47  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals agreed, finding that “[t]o
comply with the Solomon Amendment, the law schools must affirmatively
assist military recruiters in the same manner they assist other recruiters, which
means they must propagate, accommodate, and subsidize the military’s mes-
sage.”48  The 2-1 majority of the Third Circuit pointedly concluded that
“[r]ecruiting is expression.”49
The Supreme Court, however, appeared immediately wary of a First
Amendment farce, doubting either that military recruiters have an expressive
message to project or that career-placement offices have an expressive message
to preserve.  As Justice Kennedy mused, “[T]he resistance to any statute, I
assume, could be justified as symbolic speech.”50  He later challenged Rosen-
kranz: “What you’re arguing is that what is, for all intents and purposes, ‘con-
duct’ can be infused by the school, at its option, with a first amendment
quality.”51  Justice Antonin G. Scalia delved into the same theme.  “You cannot
convert a law into a law directed at . . . first amendment rights,” he reasoned,
“by simply saying, ‘The reason I am disobeying it is to express—whatever,
disaffection with the war, my objection . . . to homosexual discrimination—or
anything else.’”52  Justice Scalia then posited to Rosenkranz, “So, you are say-
ing that every time somebody gives as his reason for violating a law that he
wants to send a message that he disagrees with that law [then] that raises a first
amendment question?”53
In its attempt to differentiate the conduct required by the Solomon
Amendment from the compelled-speech claim asserted by FAIR, the Court
engaged in a protracted effort to extract from Rosenkranz an explanation of the
objectionable content in the government’s message.  “The Government just
44 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 56 (statement of Rosenkranz).
45 Id. at 35 (Justice Souter questioning Rosenkranz).
46 Id.
47 Id. at 29 (statement of Rosenkranz).
48 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 236 (3d Cir.
2004), rev’d, 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
49 Id.
50 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 24 (Justice Kennedy questioning Solicitor
General Clement).
51 Id. at 33 (Justice Kennedy questioning Rosenkranz).
52 Id. at 20 (Justice Scalia questioning Solicitor General Clement).
53 Id. at 41 (Justice Scalia questioning Rosenkranz).  Professor Tobias Barrington Wolff,
who opposes “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” offered a similar critique of FAIR’s argument.
“What the law schools are arguing for is nothing less than a 1st Amendment right to opt out
of any law that has symbolic implications with which they disagree.”  Wolff, supra note 9.
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says, ‘Let our recruiters in,’” proclaimed Justice Breyer, comparing the Solo-
mon Amendment’s conditioning of funding on equal access for military
recruiters with other straightforward government requirements, such as the
property tax.54  Justice John Paul Stevens chimed in, and repeated several
times, “The [government’s] single message is, ‘Join the Army.’”55  Justices
Breyer and Stevens were making the point that military recruiters have little, if
any, expressive message to impart, other than their clearly instrumental goal of
attracting potential enlistees and officer candidates.  Moreover, to the extent the
“Join the Army” message could be deemed expressive at all, any legislation
facilitating that message would fall clearly under Congress’s Constitutional
mandate “[t]o raise and support Armies,”56 the realm in which “‘judicial defer-
ence . . . is at its apogee.’”57  Incredibly, FAIR’s attorney agreed with Justice
Stevens.  “The single message is, ‘Join the Army,’ that is correct,” Rosenkranz
replied.  “And the government is promoting only that one message.”58  Justice
Souter, who had given the impression throughout oral argument of being the
most sympathetic to the respondents’ free speech argument, chimed in to set
Rosenkranz back on course.  “I thought your argument was, the single message
is, ‘Join the Army, but not if you’re gay.’”59  Rosenkranz, perhaps recognizing
the error of his previous concession, readily agreed.60  The damage, however,
had already been done.
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion cut to the heart of the matter, and presaged
the Court’s final disposition, in its declaration, “[a]s a general matter, the Solo-
mon Amendment regulates conduct, not speech.  It affects what law schools
must do–afford equal access to military recruiters–not what they may or may
not say.”61  The Chief Justice had said as much during oral arguments, when he
was the first to interrupt FAIR’s attorney.  “This is conduct,” Roberts chal-
lenged Rosenkranz, “denying access to the military recruiters.”62  “[The Solo-
mon Amendment],” Roberts again interjected, “doesn’t insist that [law schools]
54 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 56 (Justice Breyer questioning
Rosenkranz).
55 Id. at 54 (Justice Stevens questioning Rosenkranz).
56 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
57 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 58 (2006)
(quoting Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)).  Justice Scalia specifically discussed
Rostker during oral arguments.  Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 44 (Justice
Scalia questioning Rosenkranz).
58 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 54 (statement of Rosenkranz).
59 Id. (Justice Souter questioning Rosenkranz).  Professor Harold H. Koh, then dean of Yale
Law School, framed the law schools’ argument in this manner.  “[The Court’s] ruling seems
to require law schools to endorse the motto, ‘Join the military, but not if you are gay or
lesbian,’” he said in an official statement.  Andrew Mangino, Supreme Court Rules Against
Law Schools: Justices Say Military Recruiters Must Be Allowed on Campus, YALE DAILY
NEWS, Mar. 6, 2006, available at http://www.yaledailynews.com/news/2006/mar/06/
supreme-court-rules-against-law-schools/.
60 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 55.
61 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. at 60.
62 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 29 (Chief Justice Roberts questioning
Rosenkranz).
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do anything.  It says that, ‘If you want our money, you have to let our recruiters
on campus.’”63
III. SPEECH, EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT AND JUST PLAIN CONDUCT
How did FAIR end up leveraging virtually its entire case on the Supreme
Court’s determination as to whether or not recruiting constitutes a form of
speech?  Or, as Professor Peter Berkowitz sarcastically put it, “How did so
many professors misunderstand the law?”64  In short, the reason is two-fold.
First, the plaintiffs’ reliance on the Boy Scouts precedent65 led them, at least in
perception if not intent, to confuse the Solomon Amendment with the military
recruiters themselves.  Second, the plaintiffs’ Third Circuit victory was so
sweeping that it proved counterproductive, resulting in a grandiose argument
before the Supreme Court that the government could undermine simply by
appearing reasonable.  As will be explored below, it was FAIR’s broad argu-
ment, and the government’s pragmatic defense, that opened the door for a
unanimous reversal rooted in the historical principles of American free speech.
A. Levels of Scrutiny
When FAIR first sought to enjoin enforcement of the Solomon Amend-
ment in 2003, the district court’s denial66 made several points that were ulti-
mately ratified by the Supreme Court decision.  The district court held that “if
there is any expressive component to recruiting, it is entirely ancillary to its
dominant economic purpose.”67  The court further declared, “[T]he Solomon
Amendment does not compel law schools to say anything,” meaning that “the
law schools’ actions in assisting military recruiters are insufficiently imbued
with elements of communication to require the protection of the First Amend-
ment.”68  The Solomon Amendment, in short, “targets conduct, not speech.”69
However, the district court also went on to make an important acknowl-
edgement.  Although the Solomon Amendment seeks access for recruiters
rather than the imposition of government speech, it is not thereby insulated
“from constitutional scrutiny.”70  The court conceded that “an expressive ele-
ment can be subsumed within otherwise non-communicative conduct.”71  In
fact, the district court held, “[T]he conduct targeted by the Solomon Amend-
63 Id. at 32 (Chief Justice Roberts questioning Rosenkranz).
64 Peter Berkowitz, U.S. Military: 8, Elite Law Schools: 0, WKLY. STANDARD, Mar. 20,
2006, at 10, available at http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/
011/959tzkai.asp.
65 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 656 (2000) (holding that a New Jersey statute
requiring the Boy Scouts to accept a homosexual assistant scoutmaster violated the organiza-
tion’s right of expressive association).
66 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 322
(D. N.J. 2003), rev’d, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), rev’d, 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
67 Id. at 308.
68 Id. at 309.
69 Id. at 311.
70 Id.
71 Id.
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ment . . . [includes] a communicative or expressive element.”72  “As such, the
applicable standard of review”73 was the O’Brien74 test.  The O’Brien case,
which upheld the conviction of an antiwar protester for burning his draft card,75
established a four-part test for determining “the constitutionality of a govern-
ment regulation that incidentally impairs expressive conduct.”76  As Chief Jus-
tice Earl Warren wrote on behalf of the majority, such a regulation is
sufficiently justified if the following elements are met: (1) “it is within the
constitutional power of the Government,” (2) “it furthers an important or sub-
stantial governmental interest,” (3) “the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression,” and (4) “the incidental restriction on
alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the further-
ance of that interest.”77
The O’Brien test demands an important or substantial government interest,
rather than a compelling one.78  As such, its intermediate level of scrutiny “is
less rigorous and more deferential than the strict standards applied in some free
speech contexts, and it is more difficult to demonstrate a constitutional viola-
tion under a theory of expressive conduct than under other First Amendment
doctrines.”79  The Third Circuit, in overturning the district court’s decision
affirming the constitutionality of the Solomon Amendment, noted that “demon-
strating a constitutional violation under a theory of expressive conduct is signif-
icantly more burdensome” than under its preferred analyses of compelled
speech and expressive association.80  Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the district
court held that the Solomon Amendment successfully passed “constitutional
muster” under the O’Brien test.81
Ultimately, the district court rejected FAIR’s constitutional claims,82
thereby denying the plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction barring
enforcement of the Solomon Amendment.  However, the court simultaneously
handed FAIR a victory on non-constitutional grounds, sharply disagreeing with
the DOD’s proposed interpretation that “the statute requires law schools to
‘provide military recruiters access to students that is at least equal in quality
and scope to the access provided other potential employers.’”83  The district
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
75 Id. at 386.
76 ALISON MUHLFELD, RUMSFELD V. FAIR: THE SOLOMON AMENDMENT AND FREE SPEECH
8 (2005), available at http://www.hsdl.org/?view&doc=53474&coll=limited.
77 O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
78 See id.
79 MUHLFELD, supra note 76, at 8.
80 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 244 (3d Cir.
2004), rev’d, 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
81 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 312
(D.N.J. 2003), rev’d, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004), rev’d, 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
82 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 54 (2006)
(summarizing Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d at 322).
83 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d at 321 (quoting Decla-
ration of William N. Eskridge, Jr. at 1, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 291
F. Supp. 2d 269 (No. 03-4433), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/docu-
ments/Eskridge.pdf).
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court emphasized that its conclusion “is in no way an endorsement of the
DOD’s position”; it went out of its way to express “grave reservations as to
whether such an interpretation is sustainable as a matter of statutory construc-
tion.”84  It was “in response to the district court’s concerns” that “Congress
codified the DOD’s [then] informal policy”85 of demanding equal access to law
students, thus producing the Solomon Amendment’s current incarnation.86
FAIR’s appeal of the district court’s decision reasserted its constitutional
claims, arguing that the lower court had erred in determining that the Solomon
Amendment was aimed at conduct, not speech.87  The Third Circuit agreed
with FAIR, in the process obliterating the district court’s O’Brien analysis.
The appellate decision held that the district court had incorrectly selected
O’Brien as the applicable standard.  The majority opinion explained that the
expressive conduct governed by O’Brien’s four factors “is, loosely stated, an
overflow category,” only to be applied when other First Amendment protec-
tions are unavailable.88  In this case, however, the Third Circuit held that the
Solomon Amendment infringes upon “speech proper,”89 thus making available
stronger “alternative First Amendment grounds.”90  That is, the Third Circuit
invoked the doctrines of expressive association and compelled speech to apply
strict scrutiny, rendering O’Brien’s intermediate scrutiny standard immate-
rial.91  As Chief Justice Roberts later wrote in summarizing the procedural pos-
ture of the case, “Unlike the District Court, the Court of Appeals did not think
that the O’Brien analysis applied because the Solomon Amendment, in its
view, regulated speech and not simply expressive conduct.”92  For good mea-
sure, though, the Third Circuit added, “Even under O’Brien, the Solomon
Amendment is likely to impair expressive conduct unconstitutionally” and
thereby necessitate a reversal of the district court.93
B. An Overbroad Argument?
In effect, the appellate majority had given FAIR everything it could have
possibly hoped for, which might have been what doomed its prospects before
the Supreme Court.  In addition to holding that a statutory requirement for law
school career services offices to provide “active and equal assistance”94 to mili-
tary recruiters constitutes compelled speech,95 and that forced campus visits by
84 Id.
85 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. at 54.
86 10 U.S.C. § 983 (2006).
87 See Brief for Appellants at 18-26, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v.
Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 03-4433), available at http://www.
law.georgetown.edu/solomon/documents/CA3Brief.pdf [hereinafter Third Circuit Brief for
Appellants].
88 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 390 F.3d at 243, rev’d, 547 U.S. 47
(2006).
89 Id.
90 Id. at 244.
91 Id.
92 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 54-55 (2006).
93 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 390 F.3d at 244.
94 Id. at 240.
95 Id.
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military recruiters infringe upon the law schools’ right of expressive associa-
tion,96 the Third Circuit had gone one significant step further.  Namely, it
treated the schools’ efforts to demonstrate disagreement with the armed forces’
homosexual policy by barring military recruiters from campus as not just con-
duct imbued with expressive elements, but rather as speech itself.  Whereas
wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War,97 conducting sit-ins to
protest racial segregation,98 and picketing99 were considered conduct with an
expressive nature, the law schools’ ban on military recruitment had been ele-
vated to a loftier status as the very embodiment of expression.
The Third Circuit’s opinion seemed not even to acknowledge the enormity
of this implication.  Suddenly, in light of the court’s analysis, everything that
took place in the context of legal recruitment appeared to be constitutionally
protected speech.  The logistical assistance offered by career placement offices
to employers was speech on the part of universities; interviewing law students
for potential hiring was speech on the part of employers; and now subjecting
one employer to different conditions than others during the interview process
was a form of speech as well.  The Third Circuit’s dissenting judge, as if antici-
pating the Supreme Court’s reaction to the majority’s sweeping decision, high-
lighted the central issue.  “[E]ssentially my disagreement is with the all-
pervasive approach that this is a case of First Amendment protection in the
nude,” wrote Senior Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert.  “It is not.”100
The Supreme Court responded to the Third Circuit’s rejection of the dis-
trict court’s O’Brien analysis by moving in exactly the opposite direction.  The
Court did not merely overturn the circuit court by applying the O’Brien test, as
Judge Aldisert would have done;101 rather, it held that the law schools’ conduct
was not expressive enough even to warrant the application of O’Brien.102
Indeed, the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit appeared to agree about one
thing, and only one thing: the O’Brien test, and its “doctrine of expressive
conduct,” is “a mold [the Solomon Amendment] does not fit.”103  As discussed
in the previous section, Justices Kennedy and Scalia appeared wary, from the
outset of oral arguments, of an attempt by FAIR to convert conduct into speech
by referencing the law schools’ underlying motivations.104  The Third Circuit
may have reinforced this suspicion by emphasizing the fact that “the law
schools’ resistance to the military’s recruitment policy [was] motivated by their
ideological opposition to exclusion based on sexual orientation.”105
The Supreme Court was clearly on guard against the temptation to read
more expression than necessary into the Solomon Amendment’s prohibition on
96 Id. at 235.
97 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969).
98 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 141-42 (1966).
99 Amalgamated Food Emps. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308,
313 (1968).
100 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 390 F.3d at 246-47.
101 Id. at 260-62.
102 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65-66
(2006).
103 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 390 F.3d at 243.
104 See supra Part III.A.
105 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 390 F.3d at 243.
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“treating military recruiters differently from other recruiters.”106  The Third
Circuit’s conclusion that the Solomon Amendment was unconstitutional
because it regulated speech itself thus encouraged FAIR to take a difficult posi-
tion before a skeptical audience.  Essentially, FAIR argued broadly that the
statutory requirement to treat military and non-military recruiters equally con-
stituted an impermissible restriction on the law schools’ speech because their
disparate treatment of military recruiters was rooted in a deeply held conviction
in the equality of all people, regardless of sexual preference.  Enabled by the
extensive nature of this argument, the government attempted to extract the mili-
tary’s homosexual policy from the speech issue, and in so doing, show the far-
reaching implications of FAIR’s position.  As Solicitor General Clement told
the Court, “[FAIR’s] arguments would be the same even if what was going on
here was a concern about the military’s other policies.”107
According to the government, the plaintiffs’ free speech claims were about
much more than the military’s homosexual policy, and led ultimately to the
dangerous implication that any conduct justified by reference to one’s con-
science was entitled to ironclad First Amendment protection.  “The free-speech
interests that are articulated on the other side, would extend to any basis for
criticizing the military,” Clement argued, “whether it was not liking the war in
Iraq, the war in Afghanistan, or the discriminatory hiring policies.”108  In his
rebuttal argument, Clement continued to sound the same theme: “So, even if
Congress changed ‘don’t ask, don’t tell’ tomorrow . . . presumably, the law
schools would still be here protesting the military’s position on gender, or per-
haps the war in Iraq, or perhaps the war in Afghanistan.”109  Justice Souter
asked Clement, “So, discrimination . . . or no discrimination, you’ve got a
speech issue that you’re going to address[?]”110  Clement replied in the affirm-
ative, explaining, “[T]he other side’s position is not limited to this narrow con-
text, but is a much broader first-amendment claim.”111
FAIR’s attorney did nothing to dispel the Court’s concerns about the
breadth of his clients’ position, or to contradict Clement’s dire warnings.  The
Third Circuit’s holding had perhaps bolstered the plaintiffs’ confidence suffi-
ciently for them to adopt a legal strategy of seeking an outright victory on
broad constitutional grounds.  During an exchange with Justice Stevens, Rosen-
kranz unabashedly confirmed the boldness of FAIR’s First Amendment claims:
J. STEVENS: May I just be sure I have one thing straight?  The content of the com-
pelled speech, as I understand it, is you’re aiding in the recruitment of the Armed
Forces, right?
ROSENKRANZ: That’s correct . . . [y]our Honor.
J. STEVENS: And so, it . . . would still have been compelled speech if, 25 years ago,
Congress passed a statute saying, ‘University, you must allow our people on campus
to recruit,” and they . . . for some reason, didn’t want to help.  But that would have
106 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. at 66.
107 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 16 (Justice Souter questioning Solicitor
General Clement).
108 Id. at 15 (statement of Solicitor General Clement).
109 Id. at 64 (rebuttal argument of Solicitor General Clement).
110 Id. at 16 (Justice Souter questioning Solicitor General Clement).
111 Id. at 16-17 (statement of Solicitor General Clement).
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been a violation of the first amendment of the school if there were no other debate,
just they didn’t want the Army on because they had to provide facilities that would
aid recruitment.
ROSENKRANZ: Yes, your Honor . . . certainly, if it was against their conscience to do
so.
J. STEVENS: Well, that be compelled speech [sic], though, in your view.  That’s the
kind of speech we’re talking about, anything that helps the military raise an army.112
Justice Scalia, too, pried a startling concession from Rosenkranz during oral
argument.  “Suppose that a law-school faculty could decide that it does not
favor a particular war,” Scalia probed, “and use that as the basis for excluding
recruiters, ‘By allowing this recruiter to come on campus, you are making me
speak, in effect, to our students, saying, Join the Army and fight the war that
we’re now engaged in.’”113  Justice Scalia and Rosenkranz then bantered back
and forth for a few minutes, until Justice Scalia put the question to him again:
“[Y]ou would say that the same situation would apply if the university faculty
does not favor the particular war . . . ”  Finally, Rosenkranz relented, “Yes,
Your Honor.”114
The Supreme Court’s opinion swung the pendulum decisively away from
the Third Circuit’s inclusive definition of expression.  Whereas the district
court had held that the Solomon Amendment regulated expressive conduct, and
the circuit court had held that the Solomon Amendment regulated speech, the
Supreme Court declared that the law regulated neither.  Indeed, “[h]aving
rejected the view that the Solomon Amendment impermissibly regulates
speech,”115 the Supreme Court went on to also reject the proposition that the
conduct regulated by the Solomon Amendment is inherently expressive and
thereby deserving of First Amendment protection.  According to the Court,
“The expressive component of a law school’s actions is not created by the
conduct itself but by the speech that accompanies it.”116  Such “explanatory
speech,” which is provided First Amendment protection, proves necessary pre-
cisely because the law schools’ goal in placing extra restrictions on military
recruiters is not readily apparent to the uninformed observer.117  The law
schools’ conduct, therefore, “is not so inherently expressive that it warrants
protection under O’Brien.”118
In coming to this conclusion, the Court referenced its earlier concerns
about falsely imbuing conduct with the characteristics of speech.  “If combin-
ing speech and conduct were enough to create expressive conduct, a regulated
party could always transform conduct into ‘speech’ simply by talking about
it.”119  To illustrate this point, the Court used the example of a tax evader justi-
fying his arrears by announcing an intention “to express his disapproval of the
112 Id. at 39-40 (Justice Stevens questioning Rosenkranz).
113 Id. at 57-58 (Justice Scalia questioning Rosenkranz) (internal quotation marks omitted).
114 Id. at 58 (Justice Scalia questioning Rosenkranz).
115 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 65 (2006).
116 Id. at 66.
117 Id.
118 Id.
119 Id.
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Internal Revenue Service by refusing to pay his income taxes.”120  Just as a
principled tax evader is not entitled to have the tax code scrutinized under the
O’Brien test simply because he has announced his principles, the Court deter-
mined that FAIR was not entitled to have the Solomon Amendment subjected
to a First Amendment analysis solely because the law schools’ resistance to it
was grounded in stated principles.  Finally, the Court rebuffed the Third Cir-
cuit’s holding in the alternative that “the Solomon Amendment does not pass
muster under O’Brien.”121  Instead, Chief Justice Roberts wrote that “even if
the Solomon Amendment were regarded as regulating expressive conduct, it
would not violate the First Amendment under O’Brien.”122  The Third Circuit
was overruled both in its determination as to why O’Brien did not apply, as
well as in its application of O’Brien in the alternative.
IV. CONFLATING THE RECRUITER AND THE POLICY
As discussed in the previous section, one probable effect of the Third Cir-
cuit’s characterization of recruiting as quintessential expression was that, by
wholeheartedly sanctioning the law schools’ theory of the case, it encouraged
FAIR to make an overly broad compelled-speech argument before the Supreme
Court.  Another, arguably deeper, effect of the circuit opinion was that its
heavy reliance on the Boy Scouts case123 placed the plaintiffs in an ironic posi-
tion.  In order to profess their opposition to the military’s discrimination against
homosexuals, the law schools asserted a First Amendment right to exclude mil-
itary recruiters from campus, citing as their basis the Boy Scouts’ right against
the “forced inclusion”124 of a gay assistant scoutmaster.  The Third Circuit
referred to the Boy Scouts’ freedom of expressive association in selecting their
members as a “compelling analogy”125 to the law schools’ right to exclude
military recruiters from campus.  “[J]ust as ‘Dale’s presence in the Boy Scouts
would, at the very least, force the organization to send a message, both to youth
members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a
legitimate form of behavior,’” the Third Circuit reasoned that “the presence of
military recruiters ‘would, at the very least, force the law schools to send a
message,’ both to students and the legal community, that the law schools
‘accept’ employment discrimination ‘as a legitimate form of behavior.’”126
A. The Boy Scouts Analogy and Its Limits
From a practical standpoint, FAIR’s reliance on Boy Scouts for its expres-
sive association claim was problematic in its susceptibility to numerous factual
distinctions.  As the district court had pointed out, military recruiters were at
120 Id.
121 Id. at 67.
122 Id. at 67-68.
123 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
124 Id. at 648.
125 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 232 (3rd
Cir. 2004), rev’d, 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
126 Id. at 232 (citing Dale, 530 U.S. at 653).
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worst “unwanted periodic visitor[s],”127 not mandated members of the law
school community.  The Solomon Amendment required neither the law school
admissions office to accept certain students, nor the dean to hire certain
faculty.128  The Supreme Court noted that unlike scoutmasters’ relationships to
the Boy Scouts organization, “[R]ecruiters are not part of the law school.
Recruiters are, by definition, outsiders who come onto campus for the limited
purpose of trying to hire students—not to become members of the [law]
school’s expressive association.  This distinction is critical.”129  Thus, the Solo-
mon Amendment does not affect the law schools’ associational rights by dictat-
ing whom they must accept or reject as members of their community.
Although “[f]orcing a group to accept certain members may impair the ability
of the group to express those views, and only those views, that it intends to
express,”130 it is unclear that the same holds true for non-members requiring
only intermittent physical access.  Moreover, the Court held that the Solomon
Amendment did not indirectly affect the law schools’ group composition “by
making group membership less desirable”131; for example, by requiring disclo-
sure of anonymous group members132 or imposing penalties based on group
membership.133
Aside from “the transient presence of recruiters,”134 another factual dis-
tinction between the New Jersey public accommodations law in Boy Scouts and
the Solomon Amendment was the nature of the activity the government was
seeking to regulate.  As Chief Judge Aldisert wrote in his Third Circuit dissent:
[T]he fundamental goal of the relationship between adult leaders and boys in the Boy
Scout movement is ‘[t]o instill values in young people,’ a goal that is pursued ‘by
example’ as well as by word.  As a result, compelling the BSA to appoint an adult
leader who was committed to ‘advocacy of homosexual teenagers’ need for gay role
models,’ struck at the heart of the organization’s goals.135
In contrast, Judge Aldisert asserted, “Military recruiting is not intended to
‘instill values’ in anyone, nor is it meant to convey any message beyond the
military’s interest in enlisting qualified men and women to serve as military
lawyers and judges.”136  Judge Aldisert called these distinctions “profound.”137
For both FAIR and the Third Circuit majority, however, there was no dis-
tinction whatsoever.  The plaintiffs’ characterization of recruiting as the very
127 Id. (quoting Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 291 F. Supp.
2d 269, 304 (D. N.J. 2003), rev’d, 390 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2004), rev’d, 547 U.S. 47, 51
(2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
128 See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 69
(2006) (quoting Dale, 530 U.S. at 648) (the Solomon Amendment does not force law
schools to accept members it does not desire).
129 Id. at 69.
130 Dale, 530 U.S. at 648.
131 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. at 70.
132 Id. at 69 (citing Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87,
101-02 (1982)).
133 Id. (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180-84 (1972)).
134 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 260 (3rd
Cir. 2004) (Aldisert, C.J., dissenting), rev’d, 547 U.S. 47 (2006).
135 Id. at 260 (quoting Dale, 530 U.S. at 648).
136 Id.
137 Id.
108 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:92
essence of speech meant that the law schools’ “endeavor to ‘inculcate’ their
students with their chosen values”138 through the career placement process was
on a par with the Boy Scouts’ endeavor “to ‘inculcate [youth] with the Boy
Scouts’ values.’”139  As previously discussed,140 FAIR’s view of the funda-
mentally expressive nature of recruiting was sharply at odds with the govern-
ment’s ultimately successful portrayal of it as “an economic activity whose
expressive content is strictly secondary to its instrumental goals.”141
B. Speaking for Whom?
Further undercutting FAIR’s Boy Scouts analogy was the issue of whether
military recruiters, even if they were performing an expressive function, could
be reasonably viewed by students and other observers as speaking on behalf of
the law schools they visited.  Chief Justice Roberts challenged Rosenkranz on
this point during oral argument.  “I’m sorry,” Roberts interjected, “but, on com-
pelled speech, nobody thinks that [the] law school is speaking through those
employers who come onto its campus for recruitment.  Everybody knows that
those are the employers.  Nobody thinks the law school believes everything that
the employers are doing or saying.”142  Solicitor General Clement reiterated
that objection in his rebuttal argument, adding that, “[N]o one thinks that that
speech is being misattributed to the schools.”143  In contrast, Chief Justice Wil-
liam H. Rehnquist’s 5-4 majority in Boy Scouts clearly felt that “[t]he presence
of an avowed homosexual and gay rights activist in an assistant scoutmaster’s
uniform” risked sending a message that was not only contradictory to the Boy
Scouts’ stated values, but could also be reasonably misperceived as carrying the
organization’s official authorization.144
The Supreme Court finally rejected FAIR’s argument that “[by treating]
military and nonmilitary recruiters alike in order to comply with the Solomon
Amendment, they could be viewed as sending the message that they see noth-
ing wrong with the military’s policies, when they do.”145  Justice Breyer noted
during oral arguments that, personally, he “couldn’t find anything in the record
that finds that student who thinks, by letting the military person in, that that
school, which basically is completely against the military in this area, suddenly
becomes for it.”146  Chief Justice Roberts wrote there was “little likelihood”
that the military’s homosexual policy would be identified with the law schools,
or that the law schools’ message would be compromised or diluted by the pres-
138 Id. at 232 (majority opinion).
139 Id. (quoting Dale, 530 U.S. at 649-50).
140 See supra Part I.
141 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 390 F.3d at 260 (Aldisert, C.J.,
dissenting).
142 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 38 (Chief Justice Roberts questioning
Rosenkranz).
143 Id. at 61 (rebuttal argument of Solicitor General Clement).
144 Dale, 530 U.S. at 655-56.
145 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 64-65
(2006).
146 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 45 (Justice Breyer questioning
Rosenkranz).
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ence of uniformed recruiters.147  The Court’s opinion then added a verbal jab,
noting its prior holding that “high school students can appreciate the difference
between speech a school sponsors and speech the school permits because
legally required to do so, pursuant to an equal access policy.”148  “Surely,”
Justice Roberts chided, “students have not lost that ability by the time they get
to law school.”149  In response, FAIR’s president, Professor Greenfield,
lamented that “[t]he opinion’s tone and language was purposefully glib, even
belittling.”150
Clearly, the Court’s opinion revealed thinly disguised exasperation at what
it saw as FAIR’s attempt “to stretch a number of First Amendment doctrines
well beyond the sort of activities these doctrines protect.”151  Indeed, the
Court’s analysis of FAIR’s Boy Scouts analogy was driven by the same concern
it encountered when rejecting FAIR’s portrayal of recruiting as speech.  “[J]ust
as saying conduct is undertaken for expressive purposes cannot make it sym-
bolic speech,” the Court held that “so too a speaker cannot ‘erect a shield’
against laws requiring access ‘simply by asserting’ that mere association
‘would impair its message.’”152
FAIR’s reliance on Boy Scouts also placed it in the precarious position of
identifying military recruiters as the embodiment of the military’s homosexual
policy, thereby running the risk of “blam[ing] the warriors for the personnel
policy”153—or at least conflating the two.154  The Supreme Court’s ruling in
Boy Scouts has been criticized by scholars for, among other things, the “perni-
cious” notion “that individuals are expressive in some sense on the basis of
their physical presence alone.”155  According to this criticism, by endorsing the
Boy Scouts’ argument that James Dale’s forced inclusion as an assistant scout-
master would compromise the organization’s ability to disseminate its message,
the Court had effectively declared that “[j]ust by standing there, gay and in [the
scoutmaster] uniform, [Dale] might as well have been in a parade.”156  Yet
whatever one’s opinion of the Boy Scouts decision, the Court there at least
made an effort to emphasize the fact that plaintiff James Dale was “an avowed
homosexual and gay rights activist”157; that is, a vocal advocate of a cause at
147 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. at 65.
148 Id. (citing Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Schs.  v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250
(1990)).
149 Id.
150 Letter from Kent Greenfield to FAIR members, supra note 18.
151 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. at 70.
152 Id. at 69 (quoting Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 653 (2000)).
153 Justice Talking: The Power of the Purse: Can Congress Use It to Control Speech?
(National Public Radio broadcast Dec. 5, 2005), available at http://www.justicetalking.org/
transcripts/051205_solomon_transcript.pdf (Zengerle answering Greenfield).
154 Retired Army Colonel and noted analyst Harry G. Summers, Jr. wrote in his book on the
Vietnam War that “[b]y attacking the executors of U.S. Vietnam policy rather than the mak-
ers of that policy, the protestors were striking at the very heart of our democratic system–the
civilian control of the military.”  Harry G. Summers, ON STRATEGY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF THE VIETNAM WAR 28 (1995).
155 Diane H. Mazur, A Blueprint for Law School Engagement with the Military, 1 J. NAT’L.
SECURITY L. & POL’Y 473, 505 (2005).
156 Id. at 506 (citing Dale, 530 U.S. at 655-56).
157 Dale, 530 U.S. at 644.
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odds with the Boy Scouts’ publicly expressed views, as opposed to a mere
member of a group that the organization found distasteful.  As Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote, Dale had served as “copresident [sic] of the Rutgers Univer-
sity Lesbian/Gay Alliance.”158  A newspaper had published an interview with
Dale “about his advocacy of homosexual teenagers’ need for gay role models,”
along with a “photograph over a caption identifying him as the copresident [sic]
of the Lesbian/Gay Alliance.”159  The Boy Scouts majority was at pains to
point out that the plaintiff, by his own admission, was both an activist as well
as “one of a group of gay Scouts who have ‘become leaders in their community
and are open and honest about their sexual orientation.’”160
In contrast, FAIR took for granted that military recruiters are personifica-
tions of the armed forces’ homosexual policy, making no effort to build a fac-
tual record to show that connection.  Although critics of the Boy Scouts
doctrine might charge that labeling Dale a “gay rights activist”161 was only a
pretext for the Court to find expression in “the mere presence of a gay per-
son,”162 Dale’s activism was, at the very least, distinguishable from his sexual
preference as a factor making his status as a scoutmaster potentially expres-
sive.163  Military recruiters, on the other hand, are linked to the military’s
homosexual policy only by their identity as members of the military.  As Jus-
tice Breyer noted while questioning Rosenkranz during oral arguments, “I
haven’t even found in the record an instance where there was a recruiter who
told people that they couldn’t join the military if they were gay.”164  In this
sense, FAIR failed to either appreciate or take seriously the Court’s warning in
Boy Scouts that the legal rubric of expressive association cannot be used to
defeat any equal access law by claiming that acceptance of outsiders would
stifle the organization’s voice.165  In arguing that recruiting is expression, the
law schools apparently made the correlative leap that recruiters are thereby
expressive.  That assumption, however, was neither substantiated on the record
nor necessarily grounded in reality.  According to one prominent scholarly
critic of both the Boy Scouts decision and FAIR’s reliance on it, the law
schools’ expressive-association claim enabled them to “see expression in the
mere presence of a servicemember.”166
C. A Two-Front Misstep
The plaintiffs’ view of recruiters as expressive in their own right proved
counterproductive both as a legal strategy and as a public-relations strategy.
Since the first iteration of the Solomon Amendment in 1995,167 the law
158 Id. at 645.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 653.
161 Id.
162 Mazur, supra note 155, at 506.
163 See Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
164 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 45 (Justice Breyer questioning
Rosenkranz).
165 Dale, 530 U.S. at 653.
166 Mazur, supra note 155, at 506-07.
167 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-337, § 558,
108 Stat. 2663, 2776 (1994).
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schools’ self-titled “amelioration” activities were designed to comply with the
law’s minimum requirements, while simultaneously registering objection to
“two distinct, but deeply intertwining, sources of anger”: the Solomon Amend-
ment, as well as the underlying homosexual policy.168  As Professor Diane H.
Mazur has written, this protest strategy “principally focused on remedying an
alleged harm caused by the very presence of the military.”  The amelioration
activities amounted to “either (1) obscuring the military’s presence from the
sight of law students,” or (2) where that proved unattainable, resorting to tactics
that Mazur has termed “expressive rudeness.”169  The first goal usually
involved assigning military interviewers to a physically distant location, away
from the career services office.  The second goal “required law schools to deny
military recruiters the courtesies routinely extended to employers or other law
school visitors.”170  According to Mazur, this strategy of expressive rudeness
“focused, or even fixated, on opportunities to shame military personnel or to
make their visit to the law school physically uncomfortable or inconvenient”;
for example, by denying military recruiters amenities such as “parking, escorts,
coffee, snacks, and lunch.”171  For Mazur, herself both a veteran and a critic of
the military’s homosexual policy,172 “[S]natching coffee and sandwiches out of
the hands of servicemembers [in the name of equality] . . . is distinctively
unhelpful if law schools hope to maintain any influence in legal reform related
to the military.”173
FAIR’s focus on the expressive quality of recruiters’ mere presence was
equally unhelpful before the Supreme Court.  The Court held that law schools’
associational rights were not affected simply because they had to “‘associate’
with military recruiters in the sense that they interact with them.”174  FAIR’s
attorney had claimed during oral arguments that the Solomon Amendment
forced law schools to “host a message of an unwelcome messenger.”175  Rosen-
kranz’s placement of the adjective “unwelcome” was telling, because it
revealed, perhaps unwittingly, that the messengers themselves were unwel-
come, not just the message.  Moreover, as previously discussed,176 Rosenkranz
had considerable difficulty elucidating for the inquiring Justices the precise
nature of the objectionable message that the recruiters were ostensibly sending.
Rosenkranz’s exchange with the Justices on this point reemphasized the central
problem with FAIR’s reliance on Boy Scouts—the message that the law
schools objected to was seemingly the very presence of the military on their
campuses.  As Professor Mazur noted, the plaintiffs’ expressive-association
claims were framed “so broadly, or perhaps so loosely, that they easily could
168 Chai Rachel Feldblum & Michael Boucai, Letter from Chai Rachel Feldblum and
Michael Boucai, in DUE JUSTICE: AMELIORATION FOR LAW SCHOOL COMPLIANCE WITH THE
SOLOMON AMENDMENT 3 (2003), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/
documents/handbook.pdf.
169 Mazur, supra note 155, at 502.
170 Id. at 503.
171 Id.
172 Id. at 476.
173 Id. at 503-04.
174 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 69 (2006).
175 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 42 (statement of Rosenkranz).
176 See supra text accompanying notes 54-60.
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accommodate an expressive right to shun the military in a literally physical
sense, over and above any expressive right to be free of the government’s com-
pulsion to propagate, accommodate, and subsidize the military’s message.”177
The Court resisted this broad claim of associational rights, holding that the
“mere presence” of a military recruiter on campus was not enough to “violate a
law school’s right to associate, regardless of how repugnant the law school
considers the recruiter’s message.”178  The recruiter’s message, according to
FAIR, emanated not from anything that the recruiter said or did, but rather was
delivered by the recruiter’s presence itself.
D. Misdirected Blame
Faulting the plaintiffs for misplacing their opposition to the homosexual
policy onto the servicemembers themselves is more than simply a matter of
reiterating the civics lesson that the military is not a legislative policymaker.179
Certainly, there can be little dispute that the ultimate fate of “Don’t Ask, Don’t
Tell” is “not an issue for the military leadership to decide” because “[t]he
American people have spoken on this subject through . . . their elected offi-
cials.”180  As such, “only Congress can repeal the ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ stat-
ute.”181  Thus, one argument floated by several amici182 in support of FAIR—
namely, that the law schools were treating the militarily equally by applying the
same non-discrimination standards to all employers—was immediately under-
cut by the obvious fact that “unlike any other employer, the military’s policy is
a result of  a congressional mandate.”183
Of course, the legislative underpinnings of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” should
neither obscure the fact that military leaders were in many ways at the forefront
of the 1993 debate, nor absolve such leaders from having to face tough ques-
tions about the need for and efficacy of the policy.  Indeed, it is instructive in
this regard that the current drive to repeal the law, in addition to being pushed
by elected officials, is apparently supported by the current Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.184  Not coincidentally, an essay advocating repeal was
awarded the 2009 Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition
177 Mazur, supra note 155, at 504-5.
178 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. at 70.
179 It is, of course, true that “the homosexual policy is ultimately a matter decided not by
military commanders but by civilian leaders.”  Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., Welcome to the Junta:
The Erosion of Civilian Control of the U.S. Military, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341, 365
(1994).
180 Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2011, and to
Receive Testimony Relating to the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” Policy: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Armed Servs., 111th Cong. 59 (2010) [hereinafter Department of Defense Author-
ization] (statement of Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff).
181 News Transcript, Robert M. Gates, Sec’y of Def., DOD News Briefing (Mar. 25, 2010),
available at http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4592.
182 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. at 55-56.
183 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 5 (statement of Solicitor General
Clement).
184 See Department of Defense Authorization, supra note 180, at 59.
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prize.185  General John M. Shalikashvili, a former Chairman, recalled the dif-
ferent atmosphere in the 1990s:
When I was Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I supported the current [homosex-
ual] policy because I believed that implementing a change in the rules at that time
would have been too burdensome for our troops and commanders.  I still believe that
to have been true.  The concern among many in the military was that given the long-
standing view that homosexuality was incompatible with service, letting people who
were openly gay serve would lower morale, harm recruitment and undermine unit
cohesion.186
The current “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy187 was largely the result of a politi-
cal compromise reached between President Bill Clinton and congressional crit-
ics of his plan to lift the ban on gay servicemembers, led by Senator Samuel A.
Nunn, Jr. (D-GA).188  The congressional resistance might not have been possi-
ble without the testimony of high-profile flag officers before the Senate189 and
House190 Armed Services Committees that the presence of openly gay troops
would degrade military effectiveness.191  As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
Gen. Colin L. Powell harnessed his unparalleled popularity and prestige to
oppose President Clinton’s proposals to lift the ban on homosexuals in the mili-
tary.192  The New York Times called Gen. Powell’s resistance “disruptive,”193
and at least one prominent military historian opined that Powell had crossed the
line into impropriety.194  Powell, like Shalikashvili,195 has since expressed the
185 Om Prakash, The Efficacy of ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,’ JOINT FORCES Q., 4th Quarter
2009 at 88.
186 John M. Shalikashvili, Op-Ed., Second Thoughts on Gays in the Military, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 2, 2007, at A17.
187 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2006).
188
“[T]he policy concerning gays in the military is the product of a collaborative effort
between the executive branch and Congress.”  Dunlap, supra note 179, at 369.
189 See Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces: Hearings Before the S.
Comm. on Armed Servs., 103d Cong. 595-96, 708, 798 (1994).
190 Policy Implications of Lifting the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military: Hearings Before
the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 103d Cong. 142-43, 152-53, 347, 350 (1993).
191 Mazur, supra note 155, at 517.  For a military lawyer’s defense of the homosexual
exclusion policy, see generally MELISSA WELLS-PETRY, EXCLUSION: HOMOSEXUALS AND
THE RIGHT TO SERVE (1993).
192 Dunlap, supra note 179, at 376-77.
193 A Chairman for Changing Times, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 14, 1993, at 18.
194 Russell F. Weigley, The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from
McClellan to Powell, 57 J. MIL. HIST., Oct. 1993, at 27, 30-31.  General Peter Pace, as
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, fueled controversy by remarking that he supports the ban on
openly gay servicemembers as a matter of morality rather than on the more oft-cited grounds
of unit cohesion.  “I believe homosexual acts between two individuals are immoral and that
we should not condone immoral acts,” Gen. Pace told reporters.  “As an individual, I would
not want [acceptance of homosexual conduct] to be our policy, just like I would not want it
to be our policy that if we were to find out that so-and-so was sleeping with somebody else’s
wife, that we would just look the other way, which we do not.”  Pauline Jelinek, Pace
Expresses Regret Over Gay Remark, WASH. POST (Mar. 13, 2007, 5:18 PM), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/13/AR2007031300185.html.
195 General Shalikashvili garnered headlines in early 2007 by publicly supporting “the even-
tual and inevitable lifting of the ban.”  Originally a proponent of the policy, Gen.
Shalikashvili wrote, “I now believe that if gay men and lesbians served openly in the United
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view that the law is ripe for reconsideration.196  Other top officers of that era
still maintain that open homosexuality in the ranks might prove detrimental to
unit cohesion.197
In a similar vein, it would arguably be disingenuous for the DOD to
respond to critics of the Solomon Amendment by shouldering Congress with
complete responsibility for that law.  For better or worse, the DOD through two
presidential administrations played a significant role in the evolution of the
increasingly restrictive Solomon Amendment between 1994 and 2005; so much
so, in fact, that the law’s current iteration is a codification of the DOD’s preex-
isting policy.  The congressional practice of leveraging federal education dol-
lars on universities’ openness to recruiters certainly did not begin with the
Solomon Amendment.198  In fact, during the initial House debate over the Sol-
omon Amendment, Representative Patricia S. Schroeder (D-CO) expressed
“strong opposition” to the legislation, in part because the DOD itself found the
amendment “duplicative” of already-existing statutory safeguards.199
Whatever its original position on the necessity of Representative Gerald
B.H. Solomon’s (R-NY) proposed amendment, however, the DOD later
became an advocate of strengthening the legislation once it was in place.  On
January 13, 2000, an interim rule appeared in the Federal Register amending
the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)
to prohibit DOD from providing funds by contract or grant to an institution of higher
education (including any sub-element of that institution) if the Secretary of Defense
determines that the institution (or any sub-element of the institution) has a policy or
practice that prohibits, or in effect prevents . . . military recruiting on campus.200
The interim rule was published prior to affording the public an opportunity to
comment due to a determination of “urgent and compelling reasons” by the
States military, they would not undermine the efficacy of the armed forces.”  Shalikashvili,
supra note 186.
196 Stephanie Condon, Colin Powell Favors Repealing “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” CBS NEWS
(Feb. 3, 2010, 2:33 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-503544_162-6170668-503544.
html.  Especially in light of former President George W. Bush’s determination “that we need
to [sic] increase in the permanent size of both the United States Army and the United States
Marines,” any personnel policy that deemed certain segments of the population effectively
ineligible for military service was probably bound to invite reconsideration and additional
scrutiny.  President George W. Bush, Press Conference by the President (Dec. 20, 2006),
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/12/20061220-
1.html.
197 Merrill A. McPeak, Op-Ed, Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell, Don’t Change, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4
2010, at A27.
198 The National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act of 1969 denied
NASA funds to universities that barred military recruiters.  Pub. L. No. 90-373, § (h), 82
Stat. 280, 281-82 (1968).  The Armed Forces Appropriation Authorizations in 1971 and
1973 similarly enabled the DOD to cut off certain funding to noncompliant universities.
Pub. L. No. 91-441, § 510, 84 Stat. 905-06 (1970); Pub. L. No. 92-436, § 606(a), 86 Stat.
734, 740 (1972); see also United States v. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d 81, 86 (3d Cir.
1986).
199 140 CONG. REC. H3864 (1994) (statement of Rep. Schroeder); see also Forum for Aca-
demic and Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219, 226 (3d Cir. 2004).
200 Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Institutions of Higher Education,
65 Fed. Reg. 2056, 2056 (Jan. 13, 2000)
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Secretary of Defense.201  This interim rule was formally adopted as a final reg-
ulation in 2002.202
As critics of the Solomon Amendment are quick to point out, the DOD
regulations “exponentially toughened the law by interpreting it to require revo-
cation of federal grants to an entire university if only one of the university’s
subdivisions (its law school, for example) runs afoul of the law.”203  Whereas a
university subdivision that interfered with military recruiting risked losing
“funding from all of the federal agencies identified in the statute,” only DOD
funds would be withheld “from the offending subelement’s [sic] parent institu-
tion”204 as well.  When it came to raising the stakes in the debate over the
Solomon Amendment, the DOD was clearly out in front.
After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, “the DOD began apply-
ing an informal policy of requiring not only access to campuses, but treatment
equal to that accorded other recruiters.”205  This policy broke an uneasy truce,
one that had quieted the Solomon Amendment debate since 1999, whereby law
schools avoided Solomon’s wrath by allowing military recruiters physical
access to the university (although not necessarily the law school) campus,206
while simultaneously employing the aforementioned “ameliorative measures”
to deny judge advocates the services, assistance, or cooperation of the law
schools’ career placement offices.207  The DOD’s informal policy of requiring
not just access, but equal access, shook up the tenuous status quo and undoubt-
edly helped fuel the Solomon litigation.  In addition to FAIR’s case, professors
and students at both the University of Pennsylvania Law School208 and Yale
Law School209 brought suits against the DOD in 2003 and 2004.  Not until the
district court in FAIR found the DOD’s informal policy to be an untenable
interpretation of the existing statute210 did Congress amend “the Solomon
201 Id.
202 Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement; Institutions of Higher Education,
67 Fed. Reg. 49253 (July 30, 2002).
203 The Solomon Amendment, SOLOMONRESPONSE.ORG, http://www.law.georgetown.edu/
solomon/solomon.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
204 Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 390 F.3d at 226.
205 Id. at 227.
206 See, e.g., E-mail from Jo-Ann Verrier, Assistant Dean for Career Planning and Place-
ment, Univ. of P Law School, to LAW-JD2003@LISTS.UPENN.edu (Aug. 28, 2001, 14:59
EST) (on file with author) (“The Law School’s career planning and placement services are
available only to employers whose standards and practice conform to [the Law School’s
nondiscrimination] policy.  The University–as opposed to the Law School itself–has for
years allowed military recruiters in light of the fact that any discrimination in which the
military engages is, at this point, ‘lawful’ under the public laws of the United States. Accord-
ingly, the University’s Career Office handles military recruiting for law students, providing
full access to those opportunities for our students while allowing the Law School to continue
to uphold its own policy.”).
207 See Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 390 F.3d at 227.
208 Burbank v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-5497, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17509, at *1-*2 (E.D. Pa.
Aug. 19, 2004).
209 Burt v. Rumsfeld, 354 F. Supp. 2d 156 (D. Conn. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Burt v. Gates,
502 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2007); Student Members of SAME v. Rumsfeld, 321 F. Supp. 2d 388
(D. Conn. 2004) (dismissed as moot in light of Burt).
210 Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269,
321 (D. N.J. 2003), rev’d, 390 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2004), rev’d, 547 U.S. 47, 51 (2006).
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Amendment to codify the DOD’s informal policy” as part of the 2005 National
Defense Authorization Act.211  Thus, to criticize the plaintiffs in the Solomon
litigation for finding odious “expression in the mere presence of a ser-
vicemember”212 is not to deny either the DOD’s participation or the armed
forces’ role in the promulgation of both “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” and the Solo-
mon Amendment.  FAIR had at least a reasonable argument that the civilian
and military leadership within the DOD was complicit in helping Congress
develop policies that the law schools found objectionable.
E. An Expressive Policy
However, such a concession does not necessarily translate into a valid
argument that recruiters are expressive extensions of law and policy.  The real
substance of FAIR’s claims about expression was not that recruiters are expres-
sive—a notion that the Supreme Court recognized and rejected as a canard
from the outset—but rather that “the Solomon Amendment itself” is expres-
sive.213  In this sense, FAIR was making a distinction, once eloquently articu-
lated by Chief Justice Earl Warren, between “the tradition of exclusive
authority of the military over its uniformed personnel,” which the courts are
“ill-equipped” and hesitant to question, and the “attempts of our civilian Gov-
ernment to extend military authority into other areas,” in which a court “can
and should make its own judgment, at least to some degree, concerning the
weight a claim of military necessity is to be given.”214  FAIR’s best argument
was that the Solomon Amendment was an example of the latter, not the former.
By relying on Boy Scouts in their legal strategy, though, and by exhibiting
“expressive rudeness” in their amelioration tactics, the law schools blurred the
key distinction between the Solomon Amendment as an expressive law and
military personnel as expressive beings.215  The Third Circuit correctly pointed
out that one of the Solomon Amendment’s original co-sponsors, Representative
Richard W. Pombo (R-CA), made no secret of his intention to use the law to
send a message to universities that their shunning of the military would come
with a substantial price tag.216  Representative Pombo’s floor remarks were
extremely telling in this regard:
211 Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 390 F.3d at 228; see also Transcript
of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 10 (statement of Solicitor General Clement) (asserting
that Congress “effectively codified and ratified [DOD’s] regulatory interpretation.”).
212 Mazur, supra note 155, at 506-07.
213 Id. at 499.
214 Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 187, 191
(1962), reprinted in 60 A.F. L. REV. 1, 11, 15 (2007).
215 Mazur, supra note 155, at 502. Major General Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., former Deputy
Judge Advocate Gen. of the Air Force, has argued that the objection of gay rights’ groups to
the candidacy of Marine Corps Gen. Joseph P. Hoar to succeed Gen. Powell as Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, due to Gen. Hoar’s enforcement of the homosexual personnel pol-
icy, sent “the military community a troubling message.  In effect, [the activists] suggest that
the defiance of the policies of civilian authorities by military commanders is appropriate.
The activists imply that military officers should condition their actions not on the lawful
dictates of the civilian leadership, but on their own assessment of the present–and
future–political climate.”  Dunlap, supra note 179, at 365.
216 Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., 390 F.3d at 225-26.
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Some institutions of higher education in this country need to be put on notice that
their policies of ambivalence or hostility towards our Nation’s armed services do not
go unnoticed—either by this House or by the American people.
A growing, and misguided, sense of moral superiority is creeping into the poli-
cies of colleges and universities in this country when it comes to such things as
military recruiting or ROTC activities on campus. . . .
. . . It is nothing less than a backhanded slap at the honor and dignity of service
in our Nation’s Armed Forces; at those who have worn our Nation’s uniform before;
and at this Congress which has set in law military personnel standards.
These colleges and universities need to know that their starry-eyed idealism
comes with a price.  If they are too good—or too righteous—to treat our Nation’s
military with the respect it deserves; to allow ROTC units to operate; or to afford our
military the same recruiting opportunities offered to private corporations—then they
may also be too good to receive the generous level of taxpayer dollars presently
enjoyed by many institutions of higher education in America.
For our young men training to defend the freedoms of all Americans, and for all
those who have proudly worn the uniform of this country, I urge my colleagues to
support the Solomon amendment, and send a message over the wall of the ivory
tower of higher education.217
Representative Solomon, the Amendment’s namesake and other co-sponsor,
was equally adamant that the schools’ “outrageous” and “totally hypocritical”
position vis-a`-vis military recruiting must incur Congress’s financial repri-
sal.218  At some level, the co-sponsors’ intent was clearly to address what they
considered to be “a sign of [academia’s] deep disrespect for the military” and
bring the rogue universities back into line.219  FAIR argued as much in its brief
to the Third Circuit, asserting the intent behind the legislation “was not to
enhance military recruiting, but to redress a perceived insult and to command
respect.”220
Although Congress is certainly well within its powers to send a message
via legislation, FAIR’s larger point was that the Solomon Amendment was not
really about military preparedness at all, and therefore not entitled to the
extreme judicial deference221 normally afforded to Congress when acting under
its Constitutional mandate to “provide for the common Defence.”222  From
FAIR’s perspective, Congress was not legislating for the sake of military effec-
tiveness, but instead using the vocabulary and context of military effectiveness
to state its views “about unpatriotic universities,” just as it had earlier used
“Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” to “make a very public statement about the inferior
status of gay people in our society.”223  Representative Solomon, in FAIR’s
estimation, was not being completely forthright when he claimed to be offering
217 140 CONG. REC. H3863 (1994) (emphasis added) (statement of Rep. Pombo).
218 Id. at H3861 (statement of Rep. Solomon).
219 Mazur, supra note 155, at 499.
220 Third Circuit Brief for Appellants, supra note 87, at 8.
221 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 58 (2006)
(citing Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70 (1981)).
222 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
223 Mazur, supra note 155, at 500.
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his legislation “on behalf of military preparedness,”224 and when he repeatedly
emphasized the mantra, “recruiting is where readiness begins.”225  Whereas the
Solomon Amendment’s proponents had accused universities of attempting to
“use the military as a vehicle for social change,”226 FAIR countered that Con-
gress was using the military as a vehicle to maintain the social status quo.227
To support its assertion that the government’s military readiness rationale
was disingenuous, FAIR emphasized that the DOD at first opposed enactment
of the Solomon legislation “as unnecessary, duplicative, and potentially harm-
ful to defense research initiatives.”228  According to congressional opponents of
the Solomon Amendment, the DOD at that time would have preferred the
“flexibility” provided by the extant law to the rigidity of the proposed legisla-
tion.229  FAIR also emphasized that in the law school recruiting context, the
various Judge Advocates General’s Corps (JAG) had no problem finding eager
recruits, with or without the protective Solomon law.  The plaintiffs noted in
their Third Circuit brief that recruits were flocking to JAG, in spite of the fact
that law school administrations were either excluding military recruiters or
declining to actively assist them.230  At least in the limited context of the legal
career field, this assertion was borne out by evidence of the “intense”231 com-
petition for JAG positions.232  In FAIR’s estimation, the DOD orchestrated its
224 140 CONG. REC. H3861 (1994) (statement of Rep. Solomon).
225 Id. at H3864 (statement of Rep. Solomon).
226 Id. at H3863 (statement of Rep. Rohrabacher).
227 The Judge Advocates General vigorously defended law school recruiting as an important
national security issue.  According to The Judge Advocate General of the Air Force, “If
access to the national on-campus interviewing system is significantly restricted or denied,
our ability to contribute to the national security of the United States will be degraded.”
Declaration of Major General Jack L. Rives at 10, Forum for Academic and Institutional
Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 390 F.3d 219 (3d Cir. 2004) (No. 03-4433).
228 140 CONG. REC. H3863 (statement of Rep. Underwood).
229 Id.
230 Third Circuit Brief for Appellants, supra note 87, at 10.
231 Id. at 11.
232 However, the Judge Advocates General of the Air Force and Army, as well as the top
recruiting commanders of the Navy and Marine Corps, insisted that recruiting on law school
campuses was vital to maintaining the best qualified applicant pool of potential judge advo-
cate accessions.  General Rives, then the Deputy Judge Advocate General of the Air Force,
described on-campus interviews as “the centerpiece of AF JAG Corps recruiting.”  Declara-
tion of Maj. Gen. Rives, supra note 226, at 5.  General Rives asserted that on-campus inter-
views, which cannot be adequately replaced by other recruiting methods, provide “the most
efficient and effective means by which the AF JAG Corps can compete with higher paying
employers and meet the strong demand for face-to-face interaction with interested appli-
cants.” Id. at 6.
General Thomas J. Romig, then the Judge Advocate General of the Army, noted the
importance of Army Field Screening Officers in meeting students face-to-face on law school
campuses.  “As a uniformed judge advocate, the Field Screening Officer performs vital
recruiting duties merely by his or her presence on campus,” Maj. Gen. Romig wrote.  “He or
she conducts informational seminars about the JAG Corps and provides a human face to the
Army.”  General Romig added that curtailing on-campus recruiting at law schools would
result in “a considerably smaller pool of applicants,” as well as “the accession of less tal-
ented attorneys.”  The “physical presence” of uniformed judge advocates was “the key to
effective JAG Corps recruiting,” and therefore not readily duplicable by other recruiting
methods.  Declaration of Major General Thomas J. Romig at 7, 9, Forum for Academic and
Institutional Rights, Inc., 390 F.3d 219 (No. 03-4433).
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“crackdown” on unreceptive law schools in late 2001 not to correct a recruiting
shortfall, but “despite its successes in recruiting lawyers.”233  The DOD’s post-
2001 policy of insisting upon equal access to career services offices “was not a
matter of military need, but rather was motivated by the same indignation” that
prompted Congress to enact the Solomon legislation in the first place.234
In light of FAIR’s argument that the Solomon Amendment was less about
military necessity than it was about sending a political message, the law
schools’ choice of military recruiters as the main targets of both their ameliora-
tive and legal strategies appears even more misguided.  If the Solomon Amend-
ment’s punitive prohibitions were an expression of Congress and the generals’
frustration with intransigent universities, then it is difficult to understand why
the law schools channeled their objections to the law by focusing on military
recruiters as expressive beings whose very presence sent a discriminatory mes-
sage.  FAIR implied, although never argued outright, that the DOD somewhat
cynically manipulated the national mood after the 2001 terror attacks by sud-
denly executing “an about-face”235 and insisting upon treatment equal to that of
non-discriminating employers.  Yet other than the mere fact that military
recruiters, as the individuals actually interacting with universities face-to-face,
were the most accessible targets, their connection to any message that either
Congress or the DOD was sending was tenuous at best.  Whatever the intention
of Congress or the DOD to demonstrate their power over resistant universities,
the recruiters themselves were visiting schools with only one purpose: to
encourage and solicit applications from recruits.  FAIR’s argument that a
recruiter’s ephemeral presence “affects in a significant way” a law school’s
“ability to advocate” its nondiscriminatory “viewpoints”236 presumed some
opposing viewpoint on the recruiter’s part; Justice Breyer attempted in vain to
find evidence of this assumption anywhere on the record.237  FAIR’s insistence
that Congress’s invocation of military readiness was a mere pretext for a politi-
Admiral Jeffrey L. Fowler, then Commander of the Navy Recruiting Command,
deemed on-campus recruiting the “best” and “most effective tool for judge advocates to meet
with prospective applicants and discuss a potential career in the JAG Corps.”  Admiral
Fowler maintained that “[t]here is no adequate substitute for a personal dialogue between a
current Judge Advocate and an interested candidate.”  Especially given the inability of the
military to negotiate salaries and locations, “[t]he ability to proudly walk onto a law school
campus, in uniform, and openly talk to a potential applicant is essential to our ability to
highlight the many rewards and advantages of a career as a Judge Advocate.”  Declaration of
RDML Jeffrey L. Fowler, USN at 4-6, Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc.,
390 F.3d 219 (No. 03-4433).
General Walter E. Gaskin, then Commanding General of the Marine Corps Recruiting
Command, described on-campus recruiting as “the preferred and most successful method of
establishing initial contact” with applicants to the JAG Corps.  Declaration of Brigadier Wal-
ter E. General Gaskin, U.S. Marine Corps at 4, Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights,
Inc., 390 F.3d 219 (No. 03-4433).
233 Third Circuit Brief for Appellants, supra note 87, at 11.
234 Id. at 12.
235 Id. at 11.
236 Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648 (1999).
237 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 45.
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cal power play238 rendered recruiters an especially ill-chosen target of
vituperation.
Ironically, FAIR’s ill-fated focus on recruiters helped portray the govern-
ment as a victim of discrimination itself.239  In this way, a case that the law
schools insisted was solely about the military’s discrimination against homo-
sexuals came to encompass as well the law schools’ disparate treatment of mili-
tary recruiters.240  In his oral argument before the Supreme Court, Solicitor
General Clement insisted that the government’s only interest was to secure
equal access for recruiters.241  Less favorable treatment of military recruiters by
law schools, Clement argued, was not of concern to the government unless it
amounted, in practical terms, to an impediment to equal access.242  Unlike anti-
discrimination statutes, the Solomon Amendment “gives, not a right to be free
of any discrimination, but a right to equal access.”243  Thus, the Solicitor Gen-
eral maintained that vocal disapproval of visiting military recruiters by their
law school hosts was completely permissible under the Solomon Amendment,
so long as the recruiters’ equal access to potentially interested law students was
not functionally compromised.244  Uniformed recruiters could be treated
unequally if they were afforded an equal opportunity to do their job.245  Upon
hearing the government’s acquiescent stance toward the prospect of law
238 See Francisco Valdes, Solomon’s Shames: Law as Might and Inequality, 23 T. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 351, 354-55 (1998); see also Kent Greenfield, Imposing Inequality on Law
Schools, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 2003, at A25 (characterizing the Solomon Amendment as
“the government’s attempt to use the power of the purse to reshape the academic environ-
ment and suppress educational messages in ways it could never accomplish by direct
command”).
239 A strikingly similar episode of misplaced hostility occurred in Berkeley, California in
early 2008, when the Berkeley City Council approved a proclamation calling the three
Marine recruiters stationed there “uninvited and unwelcome intruders.”  Citing both the mili-
tary’s discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, as well as its “history of launching
illegal, immoral and unprovoked wars of aggression,” the City Council resolved to advise
the Commandant of the Marine Corps “that the Marine recruiting office is not welcome in
our city.”  Memorandum from Steve Freedkin, Chairperson, Peace and Justice Comm’n, to
Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council (Jan. 29, 2008), http://www.
ci.berkeley.ca.us/ContentPrint.aspx?id=11704 (follow “12. Marine Recruiting Office in
Berkeley” hyperlink).  Amid the inevitable backlash, including outraged politicians’ threats
to withhold state and federal funds from city services, the City Council backtracked, resolv-
ing to “publicly differentiate between the City’s documented opposition to the unjust and
illegal war in Iraq and our respect and support for those serving in the armed forces.”  Mem-
orandum from Betty Olds & Laurie Capitelli, Councilmembers, Berkeley City Council, to
Honorable Mayor and Members of the City Council (Feb. 12, 2008), http://www.
ci.berkeley.ca.us/ContentPrint.aspx?id=12798 (follow “26. Reiteration of Berkeley’s Oppo-
sition” hyperlink); see also Jesse McKinley, After Taking on the Marine Corps, A Tough
Council Gives Some Ground, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2008, at A12.
240 See Dahlia Lithwick, Law Schools Against Free Speech, SLATE MAGAZINE (Dec. 6,
2005, 6:07 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2131643 (Lithwick applauds the Solicitor General
for “a clever approach–painting the Solomon Amendment as an anti-discrimination law, as
opposed to an aggressive counter-punch at anti-discrimination diehards”).
241 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 28 (statement of Solicitor General
Clement).
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 See id. at 22-23.
245 See id.
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schools offering ostensibly equal, but clearly hostile, access to visiting ser-
vicemembers, Chief Justice Roberts quipped, “Sort of like a separate-but-
equal.”246
V. THE PATHS NOT TAKEN
Beyond enabling the government to enlist the issue of discrimination on
its own behalf, FAIR’s overbroad First Amendment argument also allowed the
Solicitor General to flip the plaintiffs’ claim on its head.  If, as FAIR asserted,
providing equal logistical assistance to military recruiters constituted compelled
speech, and tolerating the presence of military recruiters on campus constituted
compelled expressive association,247 then, as the government asked in
response, why not have the law schools respond with their own speech rather
than restrict the speech of others?248  In portraying JAG recruiting as “a dueling
exchange of expression between law schools and the military,” FAIR unwit-
tingly laid the groundwork for maintaining the status quo.249  “[T]here are two
messages going on here, and they are clashing,” Rosenkranz argued before the
Court.  “There is the military’s message, which the schools are interpreting as,
‘Uncle Sam does not want you,’ and there is the school’s message, which is,
‘We do not abet those who discriminate.  That is immoral.’”250  Leaving aside
the Court’s doubts as to whether the military’s recruiting function actually had
an expressive message at all, Rosenkranz’s position opened the door for Solici-
tor General Clement to rhetorically shrug his shoulders and argue that the two
clashing messages could simply be allowed to clash.251
Effectively, that is just what he did.  “[T]he recipient schools remain free
to criticize the military and its policies,” he reminded the Court, “and, of
course, they remain free to decline Federal funds altogether.”252  In fact, Clem-
ent’s faith in military recruiters to weather the storm of protests and inhospital-
ity took the justices by surprise.  “[T]he Army recruiters are not worried about
being confronted with speech, they’re worried about actually not being allowed
onto the same law schools,”253 the Solicitor General asserted.  Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor asked, “Does the Solomon Amendment pose any restrictions on
the extent to which the law schools can distance themselves from the military’s
views?  Can there be signs up at every recruitment office, saying, ‘Our law
school doesn’t agree with any discrimination against gays’?”  Clement
responded, “Yes, they can, Justice O’Connor.”254
246 Id. at 23.
247 Third Circuit Brief for Appellants, supra note 87, at 24 (“[T]he Solomon Amendment
combines both [compelled speech and muddling of an association’s message].”).
248 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 21 (statement of Solicitor General
Clement) (“[T]here is . . . nothing in the [Solomon] Act that prevents the universities . . .
from disclaiming [‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’].”).
249 Mazur, supra note 155, at 498.
250 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 35-36.
251 See id. at 25-26.
252 Id. at 3.
253 Id. at 26.
254 Id. at 21.
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A. Deference to Speech
Solicitor General Clement expansively defined the bounds of permissible
protest as including virtually anything that would not compromise recruiters’
physical access to law school campuses and law students.  He suggested the
law schools “could put signs on the bulletin board next to the door, they could
engage in speech, they could help organize student protests.”255  Taken aback
by the latitude the government was proposing to afford protesters, Justice Ken-
nedy inquired, “You mean, they could organize a student protest at the hiring
interview rooms, so that everybody jeers when the applicant comes in the door
and the school could organize that? . . . As when it’s, say, a job fair, and all the
employers are there . . . and the school organizes a line jeering the — both the
recruiters and the applicants, that’s equal access?”  Clement responded, “I think
that would be equal access.”256  A stunned Justice Kennedy remarked, “I think
that’s an extraordinary position you’re taking.”257  In a moment of levity, Jus-
tice Scalia interjected, “You’re not going to be an Army recruiter, are you?”258
The immediate effect of Solicitor General Clement’s early concession that
“the [Solomon] [A]mendment has to accommodate the First Amendment”259
was that Rosenkranz found himself confronting a highly skeptical panel of Jus-
tices when he followed Clement at oral arguments.  As FAIR’s attorney delved
into the expressive nature of recruiting, Justice O’Connor countered, “But the
government takes the position that the law school is entirely free to convey its
message to everyone who comes. . . . So, how is the message affected in that
environment?”260  Rosenkranz asserted, “The law schools are disseminating a
message that they believe it is immoral to abet discrimination.”261  Justice
O’Connor replied, “But they can say that to every student who enters the
room.”262  Justice Breyer peppered Rosenkranz with questions along the same
line: “What’s wrong with the government saying, ‘University, you disapprove
of what we do.  The remedy for such a situation is not less speech, it is more
speech.’”263  Justice Kennedy expressed his frustration with the law schools for
electing litigation over a pragmatic resolution.
What’s happening here is the prospective employers, the recruiters, are proposing a
commercial transaction.  And it seems to me quite a simple matter for the law schools
to have a disclaimer on all of their e-mails and advertisements that say, ‘The law
school does not approve—and, in fact, disapproves—of the policies of some of the
employers who you will meet.’  That’s the end of it.264
In addition to making the Court’s job relatively straightforward, and
thereby courting a unanimous decision in the government’s favor, Clement’s
permissive approach in the face of FAIR’s sweeping First Amendment claims
255 Id. at 25.
256 Id. at 25-26.
257 Id. at 27.
258 Id. at 26.
259 Id. at 27.
260 Id. at 37.
261 Id. at 38.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 45.
264 Id. at 49.
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had a more enduring effect as well.  It encouraged the Court to explicitly
acknowledge the law schools’ protest rights, recognizing that “[l]aw schools
remain free under the statute to express whatever views they may have on the
military’s congressionally mandated employment policy”265—or, for that mat-
ter, on any other military policy or action.  An institution’s eligibility for fed-
eral funds would not be compromised by its vocal animosity to the military’s
presence, so long as that presence was not functionally impaired.
B. Sidestepping the Conditions Debate
Had the law schools’ argument been more restrained, or the government’s
defense more demanding, the case could have centered on a very different
issue—the extent to which the government can use funding conditions to either
encourage or discourage certain viewpoints and content.266  In its Supreme
Court brief, FAIR claimed that the Solomon Amendment was “a classic case
for application of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions,”267 a legal princi-
ple holding that Congress may not use funding conditions to make an end-run
around civil liberties by constructing a de facto requirement that it could not
mandate directly.268  The Court had previously held that requiring veterans to
sign a loyalty oath in exchange for a property tax exemption constituted just
such an unconstitutional condition.269  In its editorial supporting the law
schools’ litigation, the New York Times similarly insisted that the federal gov-
ernment could not use “its power of the purse to bludgeon recipients into giving
up their rights.”270
The government first countered that the Solomon Amendment would be
“valid Spending Clause legislation,” even if that were the only authority upon
which Congress relied.271  The Solomon Amendment “is not aimed at the sup-
pression of ideas,” and thereby does not impair civil liberties and “implicate the
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions.”272  Second, given the government’s
overall argument that the Solomon Amendment was an exercise of Congress’s
constitutional powers “to raise and support Armies,”273 the Solicitor General
maintained that the Solomon Amendment “would be constitutional even if
265 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 60 (2006).
266 See HENRY COHEN, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS: EXCEPTIONS TO THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT, 26-30 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/95-815.pdf; see also Doug
Linder, Government Speech & Use of Government Dollars to Favor or Disfavor Speech
Based on Its Content, EXPLORING CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, http://www.law.umkc.edu/
faculty/projects/ftrials/conlaw/govdollars.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
267 Brief for the Respondents at 36, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547
U.S. 47 (No. 04-1152), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/documents/
briefFAIR.pdf.
268 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
269 Id. at 528.
270 Law Schools, Gays and the Military, Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2003, at WK12,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/05/opinion/05SUN2.html?ex=1380686400&
en=95b2b16c2673438a&ei=5007&partner=USERLAND.
271 Brief for the Petitioners at 43, Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S.
47 (No. 04-1152), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/documents/
GovernmentPartyBrief.pdf.
272 Id. at 42.
273 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
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imposed as a direct regulatory requirement.”274  That is, arguing about proper
and improper funding conditions was unnecessary, because Congress could just
as well have mandated an outright requirement for colleges and universities to
permit the visitation of military recruiters.
The Supreme Court quickly disposed of FAIR’s unconstitutional condi-
tions argument by adopting the government’s second position.  Justice Scalia
hinted at this possibility during oral argument, when he asked Clement why the
government was defending the Solomon Amendment “principally on the basis
of the Spending Clause,” as opposed to Congress’s national defense powers.275
Clement responded by reasserting the government’s position that “[the law]
would be constitutional, even if it were a direct imposition.”276  Scalia, in par-
ticular, emphasized his preference for evaluating the Solomon Amendment
under the rubric of national defense, noting that the law was codified under title
10 of the U.S. Code.277  In a prior case striking down a city commission order
that conflicted with military recruiting mandates, the Third Circuit had
acknowledged “the long-standing Congressional policy of encouraging colleges
and universities to cooperate with, and open their campuses to, military
recruiters.”278  In light of both that policy, as well as the “general Congres-
sional directive” to “conduct intensive recruiting campaigns,”279 the circuit
court concluded, “Congress considers access to college and university employ-
ment facilities by military recruiters to be a matter of paramount
importance.”280
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion confirmed that Congress’s “broad author-
ity to legislate on matters of military recruiting” would have supported the
direct imposition of an access requirement on the law schools.281  Congress’s
choice “to secure campus access for military recruiters indirectly, through its
Spending Clause power,” did not prejudice its ability to do so.282  In fact, the
Court reasoned that “Congress’s power to regulate military recruiting under the
Solomon Amendment is arguably greater because universities are free to
decline the federal funds.”283 Congress’s indirect approach “does not reduce
the deference” it enjoys “in the area of military affairs.”284
As a result, the Court largely steered clear of injecting itself into the pleth-
ora of case law addressing the constitutionality of leveraging government dol-
lars in support of, or in objection to, the content of speech.285  Because the
274 Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 271, at 40.
275 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 12.
276 Id. at 13.
277 Id. at 12.
278 United States v. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d 81, 86 (3d Cir. 1986).
279 10 U.S.C. § 503(a)(1) (2006).
280 Philadelphia, 798 F.2d at 86.  In Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v.
Rumsfeld the Third Circuit differentiated the case from Philadelphia.  390 F.3d 219, 234
n.15 (3d Cir. 2004).
281 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 58 (2006).
282 Id.
283 Id. at 59.
284 Id. at 58.
285 See STEVEN H. SHIFFRIN & JESSE H. CHOPER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES—COM-
MENTS—QUESTIONS 390-96 (4th ed. 2006); see also COHEN, supra note 266, at 26-30.
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Solomon Amendment was properly classified as an exercise of Congress’s mil-
itary-raising powers, as opposed to its general welfare-providing powers, the
Court found it unnecessary to analyze the extent of “Congress’ ability to place
conditions on the receipt of [federal] funds”286 as a way of indirectly regulating
matters not directly within its purview.287  This came as a disappointment to
FAIR, which had looked hopefully to assurances in earlier government-funding
cases that
[T]he university is a traditional sphere of free expression so fundamental to the func-
tioning of our society that the Government’s ability to control speech within that
sphere by means of conditions attached to the expenditure of Government funds is
restricted by the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First Amendment.288
Thomas H. Parry, president of the Harvard Gay and Lesbian Caucus, pursued
this favorable line of reasoning.  “Sexual orientation may be the issue of the
day,” he noted, ‘but if the [Solomon] law is not struck down, then Congress
will be free to use the power of the purse to make academic policy wherever
and whenever it likes.”289  This approach sought to frame the Solomon Amend-
ment in the context of “[a]cademic abstention,” the informal “doctrine . . . that
courts should defer to colleges and universities when it comes to matters like
promotions, curricula, admission policies, grading, tenure, etc.”290  Of course,
military recruiting is fairly easy to distinguish from internal academic matters
that courts may feel “ill-equipped”291 to evaluate.
Whereas FAIR hoped that Congress’s decision to give universities a
choice between complying with the equal access requirement or losing certain
funding would open the door to a debate about the limits of conditioning fed-
eral funds, the result was quite the opposite.  The Supreme Court concluded
that “a funding condition cannot be unconstitutional if it could be constitution-
ally imposed directly.”292  Chief Justice Roberts emphasized this point during
oral arguments by repeatedly reminding Rosenkranz that his clients would be
“perfectly free” to follow their consciences and bar recruiters from campus if
286 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. at 59.
287 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206 (1987).
288 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991).
289 Money and Military Recruiting, HARV. MAG., Nov.-Dec. 2005, at 64, 64.
290 Stanley Fish, The Rise and Fall of Academic Abstention, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Oct.
21, 2009, 9:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/12/the-rise-and-fall-of-
academic-abstinence.  Professor Robert Burt of Yale Law School invoked the academic
abstention argument when he stated, “[Law schools] have a special claim that we have
autonomy in running our affairs because we are a university, and there’s a tradition of spe-
cial respect for universities, and a special protection . . . to protect students from discrimina-
tory or demeaning behavior.”  Mangino, supra note 59, at 3; see also Third Circuit Brief for
Appellants, supra note 87, at 21 (“But if academic freedom means anything, it means that
the decision [to teach non-discrimination values] is the law school’s to make, free from
government interference.”); Greenfield, supra note 237 (“[Law schools] would not pretend
to tell the government how to run the military.  The military should not be telling us how to
run law schools.”).
291 Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 92 (1978).
292 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 59-60
(2006).
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they resolve not to “take the money.”293  “[The Solomon Amendment] doesn’t
insist that you do anything,” Roberts asserted.294  “It says that, ‘If you want our
money, you have to let our recruiters on campus.’”295  Rosenkranz claimed, as
part of his compelled speech argument, that if law schools permitted recruiters
on campus, while still proclaiming their commitment to nondiscrimination,
“[T]he answer of the students is, ‘We don’t believe you.’”296  Justice Roberts
retorted, “The reason they don’t believe you is because you’re willing to take
the money.  What you’re saying is, ‘This is a message . . . we believe in
strongly, but we don’t believe in it to the tune of $100 million.’”297
C. Principles Versus Dollars
The money issue certainly provided fodder for cynics who pointed out that
law schools professed a willingness to sacrifice for principle, but only up to a
certain dollar threshold.298  “The law [schools] want their principle and to pay
no price for standing by it,” wrote Professor Peter Berkowitz.299  Former Solic-
itor General Charles Fried suggested it was “just a little bit greedy” for the law
schools “to impose their philosophy on the recruiters and take the govern-
ment’s money.”300  One military legal commentator noted, “It is abundantly
clear that the pursuit of money was far stronger than belief in a position,”301
thereby “reinforcing the old adage that you can’t have your cake and eat it
too.”302  To be fair, such criticism was probably not completely accurate, in
that some law school deans were more or less ordered by their university presi-
dents not to risk university-wide funding.303  Nonetheless, the popular image of
elite law professors caught between their principles and their pocket books was
bound to stick.  An opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal, for example, con-
trasted Harvard Law School’s decision to “do what the Solomon Amendment
requires and hold our noses,” with Hillsdale College’s principled refusal of
federal dollars for failure to provide what it perceived as discriminatory data on
race and sex to government agencies.304
293 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 57 (Chief Justice Roberts questioning
Rosenkranz).
294 Id. at 32 (Chief Justice Roberts questioning Rosenkranz).
295 Id.
296 Id. at 38 (statement of Rosenkranz).
297 Id. at 38-39.
298 See, e.g., Dorothy Rabinowitz, ‘That Others May Live,’ WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2002, at
A18.
299 Peter Berkowitz, Lacking the Wisdom of Solomon, NAT’L REV. ONLINE (Dec. 5, 2005,
8:27 AM), http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/berkowitz200512050827.asp.
300 Morning Edition: Court: Colleges May Ban Military Recruiters (National Public Radio
broadcast Nov. 30, 2004), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/
story.php?storyId=4192004.
301 Matthew D. van Dalen, Rumsfeld v. FAIR, A Free Speech Setback or Strategic Military
Victory?, 31 J. LEGAL PROF. 75, 94 (2007).
302 Id. at 96.
303 According to Penn Law Dean Michael A. Fitts, then-Penn President Judith Rodin “has
required the Law School not to apply its non-discrimination policy to military recruiters.”
Memorandum from Michael A. Fitts, Dean, Univ. of Pa. Law Sch., to the Pa. Law commu-
nity 2 (Mar. 20, 2003) (on file with author).
304 William McGurn, How Hillsdale Beats Harvard, WALL ST. J., Jun. 2, 2009, at A19.
Fall 2010] FREE SPEECH AND THE MILITARY RECRUITER 127
For its part, FAIR called the amount of money at stake—an estimated
$400 million annually in the case of Harvard University305—“a fiscal gun at
the University’s head.”306  Designed to be “harsher than the penalty Congress
attaches to almost any direct command,”307 the Solomon Amendment was, in
FAIR’s estimation, a “blunt enforcement tool”308 to waive at resistant universi-
ties.  An amicus brief on behalf of seven top universities, authored by former
Solicitor General Seth P. Waxman, similarly argued that the Solomon Amend-
ment’s harsh funding threats were best interpreted as “a command rather than
an inducement.”309  FAIR’s contention that the Solomon Amendment was con-
cerned less with the “immense national importance”310 of military readiness, as
Justice Scalia opined, and more with Congress’s desire “to squelch even the
most symbolic elements of the law schools’ resistance to disseminating the mil-
itary’s message”311 was arguably borne out in the legislation.  The National
Defense Authorization Act for 2006 included not only a “sense of Congress”
that schools discriminating against military recruiters “should be denied certain
Federal taxpayer support,” but also a reporting requirement for the Secretary of
Defense to inform Congress of the schools “that are denying equal access to
military recruiters and ROTC programs.”312  Clearly, Congress did not add this
requirement in order to laud the schools mentioned in the Secretary’s report.
D. A Narrower Approach
Even had FAIR succeeded in convincing the Court that Congress did not
have the power to directly impose military recruiting visits on law schools, and
could do so only by attaching such a requirement to the receipt of federal funds,
the plaintiffs would still have had to show that the unwelcome presence of
recruiters either compelled or penalized protected speech.  FAIR’s case in this
regard was not clear cut, largely because it relied on the uncertain premise that
hosting recruiters on campus forced the schools to send an unwanted message
condoning discrimination.  Perhaps recognizing this difficulty, Professor Chai
Feldblum, one of FAIR’s founders, remarked that from the law schools’ per-
spective, “this is not a slam dunk case.”313  Many legal scholars sympathetic to
FAIR’s underlying goals felt likewise, and expressed frustration with Rosen-
305 Daniel J. Hemel, Senate Mulls Over Solomon Amendment, HARV. CRIMSON, May 19,
2004, at 5, available at http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=502627.  Another
source estimated Harvard’s annual total at $500 million. See Recruiting Redux, HARV.
MAG., July-Aug. 2005, at 60, 60.
306 Money and Military Recruiting, supra note 289, at 62.
307 Brief for the Respondents, supra note 267, at 37.
308 Recruiting vs. Rights, HARV. MAG., Jan.-Feb. 2004, at 65, 65.
309 Brief for Columbia University et. al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 4,
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (No. 04-
1152).
310 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 44 (Justice Scalia questioning
Rosenkranz).
311 Id. at 29 (statement of Rosenkranz).
312 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-63, § 582,
119 Stat. 3136, 3277-78 (2006).
313 Chai Feldblum, Professor, Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Supreme Court Institute Annual
Press Briefing 15 (Sep. 19, 2005), available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/news/docu-
ments/Transcript_SCI_Press_Brfg.051.pdf.
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kranz’s go-for-broke approach to the Solomon litigation.  ‘“Mr. Rosenkranz has
seemed determined to secure a decision on constitutional issues at any cost,”’
Professor Stephen B. Burbank lamented,314 adding that he and a number of his
colleagues at the University of Pennsylvania Law School (Penn) had filed their
own lawsuit,315 due in part to concerns about FAIR’s litigation strategy.316
The Penn professors’ complaint alleged that the DOD’s determination that their
school was in violation of the Solomon Amendment “was not justified or
authorized by the Act” itself.317  They claimed that Penn had “met its obliga-
tions” under the Solomon statute.318  Only “[i]n the alternative” did the Penn
professors claim that the Solomon Amendment violated their First Amendment
rights.319
Forty Harvard Law School professors, including Dean Elena Kagan,320
who submitted a group brief in support of FAIR, also advocated the Penn plain-
tiffs’ more cautious approach.  The Harvard professors’ brief, authored by for-
mer acting Solicitor General Walter E. Dellinger, III, argued that their law
school’s recruiting policies “[did not] violate the Solomon Amendment’s ‘equal
access’ provision because all recruiters—not just the military—face the same
nondiscrimination requirement.”321  Therefore, the Harvard amici contended
that the JAG representatives “already have access to students on the same terms
as all other prospective employers.”322  “Military recruiters,” the Harvard
professors claimed, “are subject to exactly the same terms and conditions of
access as every other employer.”323  As such, the law schools were in compli-
ance with the Solomon Amendment because “evenhanded recruiting policies
are beyond the statute’s ken.”324
The Penn and Harvard professors’ approach was based “on a close reading
of the statute in question,”325 and, more particularly, of the phrase “equal in
314 Daniel J. Hemel, Harvard Profs’ Brief Could Still Sway Court, HARV. CRIMSON, Dec. 8,
2005, at A1, available at http://www.thecrimson.com/article.aspx?ref=510433.
315 Burbank v. Rumsfeld, No. 03-5497, 2004 U.S. Dist LEXIS 17509 (E.D. Penn. Aug. 19,
2004).
316 Hemel, supra note 313.
317 Complaint at 8, Burbank, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17509, available at
1ote231_obamas_youth_townhall_ervices t http://www.law.georgetown.edu/solomon/docu-
ments/UofPennFacultyComplaint.pdf.
318 Burbank, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17509, at *6.
319 Id.
320 During her Supreme Court confirmation hearings, Justice Kagan was criticized by some
Republican senators for giving JAG recruiters at Harvard Law School the “runaround” by
forcing them to make arrangements through the school’s veterans association rather than the
Office of Career Services.  Justice Kagan was at pains to point out, “I respect and indeed I
revere the military.” See Naftali Bendavid and Nathan Koppel, Kagan Fends Off GOP
Attacks Over Stance on Military Recruiters at Harvard Law School, WALL ST. J., Jun. 30,
2010, at A5.
321 Hemel, supra note 314.
322 Money and Military Recruiting, supra note 289, at 64.
323 Brief for Professors William Alford et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at
2, Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47 (2006) (No.
04-1152)  [hereinafter Amicus Brief for Alford] (emphasis omitted).
324 Id. at 1.
325 Hemel, supra note 314.
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quality and scope.”326  These scholars contended that military recruiters’ access
was equal in both those respects, so long as they were subject to the identical
nondiscrimination policy as other employers.327  It is unclear whether this argu-
ment would have won the day had it been fully considered by the Supreme
Court.  First, the military often will—by necessity and by the very nature of its
mission328—have personnel policies that differ from civilian employers,329
whether those rules address being “too old or too young, too fat or too thin, too
tall or too short, disabled, not sufficiently educated and so on.”330  As such, the
military would theoretically be an easy target for singling out for exclusion if
the equality of recruiters’ physical access were judged by the uniform applica-
tion of a school’s policy.  Thus, the distinction drawn by the Harvard professors
between “evenhanded policies that incidentally affect the military” (such as
FAIR’s nondiscrimination policy) and “policies that single out military
recruiters for special disfavored treatment”331 may be more grounded in rheto-
ric than reality.
Second, as the Supreme Court pointed out in its decision, the congres-
sional strengthening of the Solomon Amendment in 2004 was driven, at least in
part, by the ongoing Solomon litigation.332  The district court had expressed
“serious reservations” regarding whether the Solomon law, as then constituted,
justified the DOD’s interpretation requiring equal access for recruiters.333  The
House Committee on Armed Services reported that the district court had
determined,
[T]he Solomon Law did not give the Department of Defense a basis for asserting, as
it had in the Code of Federal Regulations that implemented the Solomon Law, that
universities and colleges must give military recruiters the same degree of access to
campuses and students that was provided to other employers.”334
The bill to amend the Solomon Amendment, reported the committee, “would
address the court’s opinion and codify the equal access standard.”335  Given
this explicit legislative history, Clement noted the incongruousness of arguing
326 10 U.S.C § 983(b)(1) (2006).
327 Amicus Brief for Alford, supra note 323, at 2.
328 FAIR did not challenge the military’s homosexual policy in its litigation.  Forum for
Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc. v. Rumsfeld, 291 F. Supp. 2d 269, 298 n.8 (D. N.J.
2003), rev’d, 390 F.3d 219, 224 (3d Cir. 2004), rev’d, 547 U.S. 47, 51 (2006).
329 In response to a reporter’s question regarding article 88 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, which criminalizes public “contemptuous words” by a commissioned officer, then
Pentagon-briefer Kenneth Bacon said,
The military has specific rules that are set up to protect good order and discipline, and this is not
the first time we’ve seen that military rules may be slightly different from those in the rest of the
society. No one [outside the all-volunteer force] is forced to abide by these rules.
News Transcript, Kenneth H. Bacon, Assistant Sec’y of Def. (Pub. Affairs), Department of
Defense News Briefing (Oct. 20, 1998), available at http://www.defense.gov/Transcripts/
Transcript.aspx?TranscriptID=1756.
330 McPeak, supra note 197.
331 Amicus Brief for Alford, supra note 323, at 10.
332 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 54 (2006).
333 Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 2d at 298 n.8.
334 H.R. REP. NO. 108-443, pt. 1, at 6 (2004).
335 Id.
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that the Solomon Amendment “effectively accomplishes nothing.”336  As a
matter of clear congressional intent, the Penn and Harvard professors’ equal-
treatment argument might not have amounted to a reasonable statutory
construction.
Nonetheless, this conservative approach might have been a powerful asset
to FAIR, largely because it steered clear of First Amendment territory.  The
Harvard brief dangled this possibility before the Justices, reminding them that
the professors’ narrow reading of the statute “could resolve this case without
requiring this Court to venture into the constitutional tangle presented in the
parties’ briefs.”337  Professor Laurence H. Tribe opined, ‘“[A] truly restrained
court would decline the invitation [to take on a constitutional question if
another avenue existed for resolving the case].”’338  In fact, Justice Scalia, the
first to interrupt Clement during his oral argument, specifically asked about the
statutory argument.  “[The law schools,] I gather, would not allow other
employers, who have the same policy against the hiring of homosexuals, to
interview at their institutions,” Scalia said.  “So, [the military is] receiving what
other employers in the same situation would receive.”339  Justice Breyer
appeared to express a fondness for the Harvard brief’s approach, noting,
“[T]here is an amicus brief that says, ‘Go read the statute.’ . . . So, why not
interpret the statute in the way that the amicus brief suggests in order to avoid a
difficult constitutional question?”340
Initially, Solicitor General Clement countered the Harvard brief by empha-
sizing that the Solomon Amendment was concerned not with the equal applica-
tion of policies determining access, but with equal access itself.341  Whether the
law schools could prohibit military recruiting by eliminating employer recruit-
ing altogether was open to debate,342 but the Solomon Amendment clearly reg-
ulated “the manner of access, once access is granted.”343  That is, the law does
not require “any predetermined level of access.”344  Rather, it stipulates that
granting access to other employers triggers an entitlement to the same level of
access for the military.345
Rosenkranz, likely emboldened by the success of FAIR’s First Amend-
ment claims before the Third Circuit, made the statutory argument moot when
he “directly contradicted the Harvard professors’ claims.”346  Given the oppor-
tunity at oral argument to embrace the Harvard brief and the Penn litigation
strategy, Rosenkranz instead disowned it:
J. BREYER: Do you agree with the Government, that the statute, as fairly interpreted,
is violated when a school [that] uniformly applies to all employers the rule, ‘You
can’t come in if you have the discrimination against hiring gay people’?
336 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 9.
337 Amicus Brief for Alford, supra note 323, at 9.
338 Hemel, supra note 314.
339 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 4.
340 Id. at 8.
341 Id. at 10.
342 Id.
343 Id. at 12.
344 Id. at 3.
345 See id. at 10.
346 Hemel, supra note 314.
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ROSENKRANZ: Yes, Your Honor.347
Rosenkranz’s strategy was to seek a large-scale victory on constitutional
grounds, which he deemed worth the risk of foregoing any chance of a limited
victory on statutory grounds.348  For those FAIR supporters more concerned
with practical results than legal doctrine, Rosenkranz had just obliterated “the
last, best hope” for barring military recruiters from law school campuses.349
“Rosenkranz killed the Harvard brief argument,” lamented Professor Paul M.
Secunda.350
Not surprisingly, the Court easily dispensed with the statutory argument in
its opinion, noting, “The Government and FAIR agree on what this statute
requires.”351  The Court did take note of the Harvard professors’ argument, but
made short work of dissecting it.  “The Solomon Amendment,” Roberts wrote,
“does not focus on the content of a school’s recruiting policy . . . [but rather]
looks to the result achieved by [it].”352  If applying the identical nondiscrimina-
tion policy to all employers results in a lower level of access for military
recruiters, then the Solomon Amendment has not been satisfied.  The main con-
cern was not the reason for the disparate treatment of the military, but the dis-
parate treatment itself.353  The Court also noted the legislative history of the
recent revision of the Solomon Amendment, emphasizing, “[[T]he Harvard
argument was] rather clearly not what Congress had in mind in codifying the
DOD policy.  We refuse to interpret the Solomon Amendment in a way that
negates its recent revision, and indeed would render it a largely meaningless
exercise.”354
VI. THE ‘MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS’
From the law schools’ perspective, Rosenkranz’s bold litigation strategy
produced an undesirable result in the form of a unanimous decision for the
government.355  However, Rosenkranz’s forthrightness had the benefit of ena-
bling the Court to settle the speech-in-recruiting issue with some finality.  Had
the Harvard professors’ statutory argument won the day, it is possible Congress
would have acted to further clarify the Solomon Amendment’s meaning, much
as it did after the district court raised concerns regarding the DOD’s interpreta-
tion of the statute.  The speech issue would probably have reared its head again,
merely postponing a real resolution for another day.
Indeed, regardless of one’s viewpoint, the finality of any issue in the Solo-
mon Amendment litigation is perhaps cause for a sigh of relief.  The fascinat-
ing, and frustrating, aspect of the Solomon Amendment litigation is that it was,
from the start, an indirect attack on the military’s personnel policy, with no
347 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 51.
348 See id. at 29, 51.
349 Hemel, supra note 314.
350 Id.
351 Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 55 (2006).
352 Id. at 57.
353 Id.
354 Id. at 57-58.
355 Id. at 69.
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hope of resolving the underlying issue, no matter which direction the courts
decided to go.  As Professor Joseph Zengerle, former Assistant Secretary of the
Air Force, commented, “Part of our difficulty with [FAIR’s] case itself is that
whatever the outcome in the Supreme Court, the statutory bar to enlisting or
enrolling as servicemembers openly gay individuals will not be affected.”356
Solicitor General Clement pointed out in oral argument that FAIR’s assumption
that the military’s homosexual policy is per se discriminatory itself begged an
enormous question.357  Whether “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” is truly discrimina-
tory toward homosexuals, or merely reflective of the military’s unique role and
mission, was beyond the scope of FAIR’s chosen basis for litigation.
A. Open Exchange
The Solomon decision did effectively settle at least one skirmish in a
wider battle—the question of using free speech rights to keep military
recruiters physically off law school campuses.  The contrasting litigation strate-
gies of FAIR and the government facilitated this resolution.  Indeed, Rosen-
kranz’s bold approach laid bare the startling breadth of the plaintiff’s First
Amendment claims, revealing just how potentially restrictive of speech those
claims could be if adopted by the Court.  In particular, FAIR’s emphasis on
“expressive association” threatened to extend that doctrine beyond even its
interpretation in the Boy Scouts case, in so doing realizing the very fears
expressed by the Boy Scouts dissenters.
The concept of a group’s First Amendment right to resist certain members,
so as not to dilute its unified voice, is rooted in a 1984 case358 pitting a non-
profit organization’s gender restrictions against a Minnesota state nondiscrimi-
nation law.  The Jaycees, an organization dedicated to developing leadership
among young men,359 limited its regular voting membership to males between
the ages of eighteen and thirty-five.360  The Court noted, “There can be no
clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an associ-
ation than a regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not
desire.”361  Nonetheless, the Court held that Minnesota’s compelling state
interest in combating sex discrimination trumped the Jaycees’ associational
rights, and found that the inclusion of women would not impede the Jaycees’
“ability to engage in [its First Amendment] protected activities or to dissemi-
nate its preferred views.”362
In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor’s concern was that the
Court’s analysis had provided both too much protection to expressive associa-
tion by failing to analyze what kind of organization the Jaycees really were, as
356 Justice Talking, supra note 153.
357 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 15.
358 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).
359 According to its website, the Jaycees now accept women. See About the Jaycees, U.S.
JUNIOR CHAMBER JAYCEES, http://www.usjaycees.org/index.php?option=com_content&task
view&id=5&Itemid=33 (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
360 The Jaycees age limit has also since expanded to 41. See U.S. JUNIOR CHAMBER
JAYCEES, http://www.usjaycees.org/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
361 Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623.
362 Id. at 627.
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well as too little protection to this important freedom by subjecting the group’s
message to a stringent analysis.  For O’Connor, the real litmus test should be
whether or not “the association is predominantly engaged in protected expres-
sion.”363  This question is vital because it goes to the root of associational
rights, which derive from “the recognition that the formation of an expressive
association is the creation of a voice, and the selection of members is the defi-
nition of that voice.”364  The Jaycees, however, were involved in “commercial
activities,” such as “recruitment and selling.”365  These activities undercut the
notion that “regulation of its membership [would] necessarily affect, change,
dilute, or silence one collective voice that would otherwise be heard.”366
According to Justice O’Connor, “An association must choose its market.  Once
it enters the marketplace of commerce in any substantial degree it loses the
complete control over its membership that it would otherwise enjoy if it con-
fined its affairs to the marketplace of ideas.”367
Professional schools, and most certainly their career placement offices, are
not confined to the marketplace of ideas.  They are heavily invested in the
marketplace of professional employment.  Thus, FAIR’s claim that the law
schools were entitled to First Amendment protection of the associational right
to define their membership is, according to Justice O’Connor’s analysis in the
Jaycees case, substantially compromised by the commercial nature of the activ-
ity that the schools were engaged in.  Law schools are not, as a whole, predomi-
nantly engaged in advocacy on public affairs, nor, presumably, would most of
their scholars, students, and staff be pleased to hear that they speak with one
unified voice.  The notion that admitting an iconoclastic member, let alone
allowing a periodic military visitor, would dilute or alter the law schools’ col-
lective voice is highly suspect.
More importantly, a marketplace of ideas cannot thrive where contact
between different elements of society is effectively cut off.  Such a result would
be anathema to the tradition of vigorous public debate.368  The freedom of
expressive association—along with its corollary, the right to choose which par-
ticular ideas one will and will not be associated with—does not confer a corre-
sponding right to physical or visual distance from individuals deemed
distasteful.  This does not mean we should in any way discount the pain of a
student who sees a military recruiter on campus and feels uncomfortable
because of the homosexual policy.  It does, however, set limits on how far
universities can go in “protecting gay students from direct confrontation with
363 Id. at 635 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
364 Id. at 633.
365 Id. at 640.
366 Id. at 635-36.
367 Id. at 636.
368
“Indeed, there would be no such stories [of courage] had this nation not maintained its
heritage of free speech and dissent, had it not fostered honest conflicts of opinion, had it not
encouraged tolerance for unpopular views.” JOHN F. KENNEDY, PROFILES IN COURAGE 223-
24 (HarperCollins Publishers Inc. 2004) (1956).
134 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 11:92
discrimination.”369  Using the First Amendment to keep differing viewpoints
separate is an uncertain, and potentially unhealthy, exercise.370
This approach is also at odds with the best traditions of the schools them-
selves.  Indeed, “by condoning the exclusion of military recruiters from cam-
puses—billed as ‘marketplaces of ideas’—these universities legitimized
censorship of ‘politically incorrect’ views.”371  Former Harvard President Law-
rence H. Summers, before reversing course under faculty pressure, initially
expressed reservations about the strategy of seeking exclusion, “‘through the
quintessentially adversarial act of filing a lawsuit,’” rather than dialogue.372
As one Harvard undergraduate wrote:
If the University community thinks the current military’s policies are wrong-
headed, why then discourage its own students from joining up and trying to improve
them?  It’s not as though the recent wave of corporate scandals has prompted
Harvard Business School to discourage students from joining accounting firms.
Quite the opposite, in fact.  Usually, if Harvard thinks something in the world is
wrong, it throws its academic resources behind solving the problem.  Why not with
the military?  If “Don’t ask, don’t tell” is the wrong policy, offer solutions and assis-
tance.  Hold panels.  Write reports.  Don’t withhold students and don’t make signing
up difficult for undergraduates.373
On issues of public importance, engagement—even, or maybe especially, when
fraught with tension—is better than no conversation at all.  Keeping the mili-
tary off campus is no way to “meaningfully address” perceived discrimination;
it only excuses academia “from actively engaging with the military,” and vice-
versa.374  In contrast, “[c]hallenging the basic assumptions of any institution—
be it a country or a college—is itself a way to improve that institution.  This
point applies in a special way to universities, which pride themselves on pro-
moting dissent and Socratic questioning.”375
B. A Professional Caste
Artificially restricting the marketplace of ideas by excluding military rep-
resentatives from campus yields troubling ramifications not only as to speech,
but also as to the state of civil-military relations.  As the House Armed Services
Committee recognized more than thirty years ago, “‘[the] national interest is
best served by colleges and universities which provide for the full spectrum of
opportunity for various career fields, including the military field . . . by the
opportunity for students to talk to all recruiting sources, including military
369 Joan Schaffner, Should Law Schools Bar Student Organizations From Inviting the Mili-
tary to Campus for Recruitment Purposes?, 57 J. LEGAL EDUC. 162, 171 (2007).
370 Anthony Lewis has argued that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s famous dissent in
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 627-31 (1919), “made legal doctrine of John Stuart
Mill’s argument for the value of contrary opinions.” LEWIS, supra note 23, at 80.
371 Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., The Origins of the Military Coup of 2012, PARAMETERS, Winter
1992-93, at 2, 19 n.70.
372 Recruiting vs. Rights, supra note 308.
373 Garrett M. Graff, Crimson, White, and Blue, HARV. MAG., Nov.-Dec. 2002, at 72, 73.
374 Learned Foote, Why Columbia Should Welcome ROTC, WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2008, at
A17.
375 Donald A. Downs, ROTC and the Future of Liberal Education, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC.
REV., May 15, 2009, at B8.
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recruiters.’”376  President Obama made a similar argument at Columbia Uni-
versity during the 2008 campaign.  “I recognize that there are students here
who have differences in terms of military policy,” he said.  “But the notion
that—young people here at Columbia or anywhere in any university—aren’t
offered the choice, the option of participating in military service I think is a
mistake.”377
Rather than facilitating interaction between the military and the academy,
the law schools’ approach threatened to widen the gulf between the two.
Although those institutions necessarily reflect different core outlooks—the for-
mer “duty-based” and the latter rights-based—creating too wide a disconnect is
generally seen as unhealthy for both.378  On one side, “Exposing future officers
to the intellectual virtues of civilian universities improves and broadens the
military mind, which contributes to the maintenance of appropriate civilian
contact and control.”379  On the other side, “[A]n appropriate military presence
can contribute to the intellectual and moral diversity on the campus.”380
Indeed, if it is considered desirable to have “a well-rounded officer corps incul-
cated with the principles of freedom, democracy, and American values through
close contact with civilians on an open college campus, and through a liberal
education taught by a primarily civilian academic faculty,”381 then an ‘“out-of-
sight, out of mind’” approach on the part of universities is distinctly
unhelpful.382
Like ROTC programs, which have a democratizing effect on the armed
services by ensuring a steady influx of junior officers from civilian schools
across the country, the military’s ability to recruit at a wide variety of law
schools facilitates a diverse and well-rounded cadre of judge advocates.383
“Limiting the pool” of available officers to fill JAG billets (or any other mili-
tary career field, for that matter) contributes in the end to “a much more uni-
formly oriented military elite,” drawn from less diverse educational
backgrounds.384  Major General Thomas J. Romig, formerly the Judge Advo-
cate General of the Army, observed that the field-screening officer who visits
law school campuses to disseminate information about military job opportuni-
ties “is often the first judge advocate whom a law student has ever met.”385
Enabling that student to meet a uniformed lawyer and consider military service
is the key to preventing the accession of an ostensibly monolithic bloc of judge
376 United States v. City of Philadelphia, 798 F.2d 81, 87 (3d Cir. 1986).
377 Senator Barack Obama, ServiceNation Presidential Forum (Sept. 11, 2008), available at
http://www.servicenation.org/pages/Summit-Program-Transcripts-and-Media (follow “Dow-
nload Presidential Candidates Forum Transcript” hyperlink).
378 Downs, supra note 375.
379 Id.
380 Id.
381 Harry G. Summers, Jr., Stalking the Wrong Quarry, WASH. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1989, at F3.
382 Downs, supra note 375 (quoting Prof. David Gelernter of Yale Univ.).
383 One prominent journalist calls this the “leavening effect” of people from nonmilitary
backgrounds entering the service.  Thomas E. Ricks, The Widening Gap Between the Mili-
tary and Society, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1997, at 66, 74.
384 Dunlap, supra note 370, at 11; see MICHAEL S. NEIBERG, MAKING CITIZEN-SOLDIERS:
ROTC AND THE IDEOLOGY OF AMERICAN MILITARY SERVICE 133 (2001).
385 Declaration of Major General Thomas J. Romig, supra note 232, at 7.
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advocates, all of whom chose a career in the military before ever contemplating
a career in the law.386  When military service, not to mention awareness of
military job opportunities, is left only to those who already have a connection
or commitment to the armed forces, the natural result is a military population
drawn from military families and intent on staying in the military for a full
career; in other words, a “professional military caste.”387
A defense establishment that is physically and psychologically distant
from the population it serves carries with it evident dangers.388  Among these
hypothetical perils is the bleak prospect of an isolated, resentful military,
directed by uninformed civilian political decision makers who are either con-
temptuous of the military, overly enamored with it, or both.  As Thomas E.
Ricks predicted more than a decade ago in the Atlantic Monthly, “It now
appears not only possible but likely that over the next twenty years the U.S.
military will revert to a kind of garrison status, largely self-contained and
increasingly distinct as a society and subculture.”389  According to Major Gen-
eral Romig, “Without on-campus access to law students and the Career Ser-
vices Directors, the Army JAG Corps will receive applications only from those
already familiar with the military.”390  Avoiding such a scenario is beneficial to
386 In an article advocating civilian education for military officers, Gen. David H. Petraeus
argued that the best way to combat the military’s “cloistered existence” is to expose officers
to environments in which they are “repeatedly challenged” and cannot hide behind either
military camaraderie or military doctrine.  David H. Petraeus, Beyond the Cloister, AM.
INTEREST, July-Aug. 2007, at 16, 16-19.  General Dunlap has made a similar suggestion:
To broaden the outlook of future officers, and to acquaint more of the Meritocrats [civilian
political elites] with members of the armed services, military academy cadets should spend a
year at a top civilian institution.  For the same reasons, mid-level officers should spend at least
one year obtaining an advanced degree in a residence program at a leading university.  Civilian
universities should include more national security and military history courses in their curricula.
Dunlap, supra note 179, at 390-91.  Journalist Amy Waldman has noted that
[v]arious . . .  measures could improve civil-military relations: Require military officers to go to
civilian graduate schools and civilian decision makers to spend time at military academies; pre-
serve or restore ROTC on campuses, both to provide access to the military and because its mere
presence can educate students about military affairs; and have undergraduates study military
history and culture.
Amy Waldman, GIs—Not Your Average Joes: What the Military Can Teach Us About Race,
Class, and Citizenship, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1996, at 26, 33.  Thomas E. Ricks wrote that
“[w]henever possible, military officers pursuing higher degrees should be sent to civilian
universities, whether or not this means closing some military schools.”  Ricks, supra note
383, at 78.
387 Waldman, supra note 386, at 29.
388 For a different perspective on the military-civilian divide, see George F. Will, Forrestal
Lecture at the United States Naval Academy (Jan. 24, 2001), available at http://www.
usna63.org/tradition/history/WillMidnLecture.html.  According to Will,
We’re told all the time that there is a large and growing problem and that there is a need to close
the gap between the military and civilian society. [sic] I think that the gap is healthy and the gap
is necessary, that the gap must exist in any society and, in a sense, especially in a democratic
society. That is because the military must be an exemplar of certain virtues that will, at any given
time, seem anachronistic and it is a function of the military to be exemplars.
Id.
389 Ricks, supra note 383, at 69. See generally, THOMAS E. RICKS, MAKING THE CORPS
(1998).
390 Declaration of Major General Romig, supra note 232, at 9.
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the military and to the public because it protects against the development of an
“intellectually alienated officer corps” insulated from society and uniform in
outlook.391  It is, moreover, similarly advantageous to the concerned law
schools themselves because it affords them the best opportunity to have a hand
in molding future generations of military legal leaders.392
VII. CONCLUSION
Throughout the Solomon Amendment litigation, Solicitor General Clem-
ent was careful to frame the government’s position in terms of functional,
rather than expressive goals.  He maintained that relegating JAG recruiters to
undergraduate campuses or off-campus locales was unequal treatment not
“because of the message it sends,” but only “because it denies the opportunity
to recruit as effectively.”393  “[T]here might be a line,” he conceded, “where [a
law school] recruitment office could conduct itself in a way that would effec-
tively deny access.”394  That line, however, would not be crossed by signs,
peaceful protests, or symbolic speech.  The military’s only concern, Clement
asserted, was with “conduct that effectively negates” its access to campus,
thereby amounting to a “functional difference.”395
The government’s position impliedly expressed a great deal of faith in
military recruiters to weather the storm of hostile receptions.  By doing just
that, recruiters play an important role in a delicate balancing act of national
priorities: the armed forces gain unfettered access to a potential labor pool,
while aggrieved parties are free to exercise their full panoply of expressive
rights in denouncing an unwelcome guest.  Thus, the dean of Harvard Law
School, expressing disappointment with the Court’s decision, simultaneously
expressed “hope that many members of the . . . community will accept the
[C]ourt’s invitation to express their views clearly and forcefully regarding the
military’s discriminatory employment policy.”396  The dean of Penn Law
391 Dunlap, supra note 370, at 11.  Another author called this military insulation “the crux
of our civil-military divide: As American society grows more socially distant from its own
military, American warrior consciousness is further intensifying within the combat arms
community itself.”  Robert D. Kaplan, On Forgetting the Obvious, AM. INTEREST, July-Aug.
2007, at 6, 11.
392 Some in the antiwar movement have suggested that having more servicemembers from
elite schools and privileged backgrounds would act as a deterrent to future wars.  According
to Sen. Jim Webb (D-VA), “[I]t’s only when the mothers of Harvard wake up and worry
about their son or daughter that we are going to have a hedge against adventuris[m].” Morn-
ing Edition: GI Bill Proposal Expands College Benefits for Vets (National Public Radio
broadcast Apr. 10, 2008), available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId
=89420368.  In this sense, it particularly troubling that so many of the leading litigants seek-
ing to exclude recruiters from law school campuses were among the most prestigious schools
in the country.  As one commentator has written, “Ivy League campuses also have been a
wellspring for more liberal-minded officers.”  An influx of nontraditional officer candidates
can help “mitigate [the] homogeneity” that the professional, all-volunteer military might
otherwise assume; preventing the accession of “insider[s] with a different outlook [is] very
bad for a military in a democracy.”  Waldman, supra note 386, at 30.
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School, as the case was still unfolding, promised to take “ameliorative action,
including the posting of information about the military’s discrimination policies
with their recruiting materials, and presenting programs on topics of relevance
throughout the year.”397
These responses from leaders of the legal academic community crystallize
the free speech victory that the Solomon case ultimately achieved.  Since the
Supreme Court decision, various essays, symposia, and presentations have
responded to “the Court’s invitation to students, administrators, and faculty
who oppose the Solomon Amendment and/or the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy
. . . to remedy what they take to be ‘bad speech’ and unwanted association with
more speech and association.”398  From the law schools’ perspective, the “sil-
ver lining” in the Court’s decision was that its “clear language once and for all
freed up students, faculty, and administrators to protest without fear of repri-
sal.”399  At best, this “call to action”400 presents an opportunity for additional
dialogue and advocacy through lawful resistance to a perceived discriminatory
policy.  In their eagerness to speak out in the aftermath of the Solomon deci-
sion, the law schools have actually affirmed the Court’s central holding.
Instead of excluding the military from campus altogether, the schools have
made a profound determination: “[t]he more speech, the better for both social
justice and law school performance.”401
The core lesson of Rumsfeld v. FAIR is perhaps best exemplified by a
speech delivered by Harvard’s current president at a recent ROTC commission-
ing ceremony.  President Drew G. Faust chose to attend, thereby formally
acknowledging the students’ service and recognizing an organization that has
long been denied an official presence on campus.  At the same time, she
expressed her opposition to the homosexual policy, stating her belief that
“every Harvard student should have the opportunity to serve in the military, as
you do.”402  Faust ran the risk of pleasing nobody.  She could have alienated
some members of the community for offering pointed criticism during her com-
missioning speech, and still other members of the community for attending the
ceremony and speaking at all.  In other words, the president interacted with
members of an institution that she may not always agree with, during the course
of which she respectfully and unequivocally voiced her opinion.
That is free speech at its best.
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402 Drew Gilpin Faust, President, Harvard Univ., Remarks at the Harvard ROTC Commis-
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